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Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMO")' and their predeces-
sors have long been quiet fixtures in the market for health care
services.2 In the past quarter-century, however, HMOs have prolifer-
ated rapidly,3 largely in response to the failure of traditional health
care financing models to contain costs, foster accountability, and
ensure access to a rational system of care. Critics of the health care
1. HMOs are a form of prepaid health plan in which the enrollee pays a fixed premium
to the plan and, in return, receives all the health services he or she requires during the period
of enrollment. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589,591 (1st Cir. 1993).
These services are delivered by the plan's "panel" or "network" of health providers. HMOs
control their financial risk by "managing" care in several ways, some of which include: (1)
selective provider contracting-the plan negotiates lower payment rates with health providers
who, in turn, become members of the plan's panel and receive higher patient volume; (2)
utilization review-the plan carefully scrutinizes bills, refusing to pay for unnecessary services
and negotiating lower rates for questionable services; (3) case management-the plan ensures
that each enrollee receives services in the most appropriate but least expensive setting; and (4)
wellness programs-the plan promotes primary care, under the assumption that this will reduce
the subsequent need for costly treatments to cure conditions that could have been avoided. See
id.; see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1409 (7th
Cir. 1995) (describing method by which HMOs price and deliver medical services), cert. denied
116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).
2. At the turn of the century, at least two common forms of third-party payment for
medicine bore striking similarity to modem HMOs. The first form is "contract practice," in
which corporations employed physicians to meet the medical needs of employees. SeeJAMES G.
BURROW, ORGANIZED MEDICINE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 119-20 (1977); JOHN S. HALLER, JR.,
AMERICAN MEDICINE IN TRANSITION, 1840-1910, at 24547 (1981). The second form is "corporate
practice," in which for-profit corporations employing physicians marketed medical services to
the public. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 204 (1982).
In addition to being structured similarly to modem HMOs, these arrangements frequently
employed cost-control mechanisms similar to those employed by HMOs, including second
opinions before surgery, review of hospital length of stay, and refusal to pay for services deemed
unnecessary. See id. at 205.
3. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE
DATA 19-20 (1991) [hereinafter HIAA SOURCE BOOK] ("[HMO] enrollment increased from less
than two million in the early 1970s to almost 34 million by June 1990." (citing 1990 Study by
The InterStudy Edge)). A subsequent study by The InterStudy Competitive Edge (the group
changed its name) reports total HMO enrollment of more than 42 million as ofJuly 1993. See
THE INTERSTUDY COMPETITIVE EDGE, 3 BIANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY no. 2, 1 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 INTERSTUDY REPORT]. By January 1, 1995, 562
HMOs served more than 46 million enrollees. See THE INTERSTUDY COMPETITIVE EDGE, 5.2
HMO INDUSTRY REPORT 1 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 INTERSTUDY REPORT].
4. See Alain C. Enthoven, The Histoy and Pindples of Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF.,
Supp. 1993, at 25 (describing shortcomings of "traditional" health insurance, characterized by
fee-for-service reimbursement, numerous solo practitioners, unlimited choice of provider, and
remote "third party" payment).
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industry attribute these failures to an imperfect market for health
services that places too little emphasis on price competition, gives
consumers too little information on which to judge quality, and raises
the cost of changing health plans to a prohibitive level for many
individuals.5 HMOs emerged in the early 1970s as a form of health
care financing capable of correcting many of the failures in the
market for health care services.6 Congress enacted the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 19737 in an effort to make HMOs
more widely available,8 and HMOs have since become a cornerstone
in the burgeoning "managed care" sector of the health care industry.9
The rapid growth of the HMO market, ironically, has both
underscored the success of HMOs as an economically efficient form
of health care financing and raised the specter of anticompetitive
market forces that may inflate health care costs." There is now a
growing debate over whether HMOs will bring the health care market
closer to optimum efficiency,"l or whether-and at what point-their
5. See id. at 40 (describing existing health care system as "an extremely wasteful and
inefficient system that has been bathed in cost-increasing incentives for over fifty years"); see also
Jonathan E. Fielding & Thomas Rice, Can Managed Competition Solve the Problems of Market Failure?,
HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 225 (concluding that increased, though not absolute, competition
has potential to foster system-wide efficiency in health care market).
6. See Paul M. Ellwood et al., Health Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED. CARE 291, 291 (1971)
(noting that health policy advocates called for wider utilization of HMOs as solution to growing
problems of health care cost and access); Enthoven, supra note 4, at 27-28 (stating that in 1973,
efforts of many health policy advocates paid off when Congress adopted Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1994).
8. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 requires that all employers of 25 or
more employees include HMO enrollment as an option in any employer-sponsored health
benefit plan. See id. § 300e-9. In addition, The Act places minimum coverage and operating
requirements on HMOs. See id. §§ 300e to 300e-1.
9. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 23 (1995) (stating that in 1988, 73% of individuals
insured by private health insurance had traditional indemnity coverage, and 27% were covered
by HMOs and other forms of managed care). By 1993, indemnity insurance accounted for only
33% of the private health insurance market, with HMOs and other forms of managed care
claiming 65% of the market. See id. Hybrid plans, such as "point of service" plans, which
combine gatekeeper or network functions of HMOs with partial coverage of out-of-network
services, accounted for the remaining portion of the market. See id. This trend was largely a
response to demands by employers and employees to curb soaring health insurance premiums.
See id.
10. See Robert E. Bloch & Donald M. Falk, Antitrust, Competition and Health Care Reform, 13
HEALTH AFF., Spring (1) 1994, at 206, 207-08 (observing that bringing large groups of consumers
and providers together under managed care will introduce substantial market efficiencies, but
will pose equally substantial antitrust risks). Two potential anticompetitive consequences of
managed care include: (1) alliances of health care providers will have substantial market power,
see id. at 209; and (2) large health plans will have the potential to foreclose competition from
rivals, see id. at 212.
11. Although there are many definitions of"optimum efficiency," common ideas embodied
in most definitions include: (1) numerous sellers and consumers; (2) homogenous products
and services; (3) readily available information about quality and price; (4) ease of entry into the
market for sellers; (5) consumer ability to change among like products or services; and (6) low
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tendency to concentrate health care resources will threaten market
efficiencies.1 Nowhere is this debate more audible than in the
growing field of health care antitrust law.'
3
At the core of this new antitrust debate is an increasing tension
among the competing interests involved in managed care. Consum-
ers, including employers, private individuals and government, demand
economically feasible health coverage that affords them access to
primary care and preventive medicine. 4 Insurers have responded
to this demand by structuring managed care arrangements15 that
restrict the consumer's choice of provider while offering patients a
more comprehensive set of health benefits.' 6 These arrangements
enable insurers to negotiate lower rates with a limited number of
transaction costs, or "externalities." See Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect
Information: The Staggering Implications ofEastnan Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a
Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REv. 336, 345 (1993) (citing HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1-2 (1985); GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE
87 (3d ed. 1966)); Fielding & Rice, supra note 5, at 216-17 (citing J.M. HENDERSON & R.E.
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH (1971)).
12. See Rick Loomis, Will Giant HMOs Help Health Care?., LA TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at DI
(questioning whether pending HMO merger resulting in 4.4 million members, $5.4 billion in
revenues, and gains for executives of more than 10,000% on company shares will work to
detriment or benefit of consumers, competition, and cost).
13. See MARK A. HALL & IRA MARK ELLMAN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 186 (1990)
(noting that, until 1980s, antitrust suits rarely were seen in health care industry). Antitrust
litigation now is among the most rapidly growing areas of health care law. See id.
14. SeeJon Christianson, Can HMOs Contain Workers' Compensation Medical Care Costs?, in
REVIEW, REGULATE OR REFORM? WHAT WORKS TO CONTROL WORKERS' COMPENSATION MEDICAL
COSTS 146, 153-54 (Workers' Compensation Res. Inst., Thomas W. Granneman ed., 1994)
(noting that from 1988 to 1993, HMO premiums increased at average annual rate of two percent
to five percent less than premiums for traditional indemnity insurance or PPO plans despite
offering richer benefits, less consumer cost sharing, and no pre-existing condition exclusions).
Although some studies suggest HMOs will effect only a temporary reduction in health care
inflation, others have shown HMO premium increases as much as 40% below those of standard
indemnity plans. See id.; see also Barbara Sande Dimmitt, Managed Care Has Become the Dominant
Mode of Health Care Delivery in the United States, and Providers Must Deliver Not Only on Price, But Also
on Value, Quality, and Performance, Bus. & HEALTH, Jan. 1995, at 24 (noting that consumer
demand continues to force health care industry to restructure itself to meet imperatives of
managed care); cf. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Star.
914 (1973) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1994)) (requiring employers
of 25 or more employees to offer HMO coverage option to employees).
15. HMOs can be divided into five categories depending on the kind of arrangements
under which they contract with providers. See Christianson, supra note 14, at 148. These
arrangements include: (1) the staff model HMO, which delivers care through physicians who
are employees of the HMO; (2) the group model, which contracts with a single multispecialty
group of providers to deliver services; (3) the network model, which contracts with multiple
groups of physicians, as well as individual physicians; (4) the independent practice association,
or "IPA," which contracts directly with individual physicians or physician associations; and (5)
the mixed model, which contains elements of the other models. See id.
16. See id. at 149. The three strategies HMOs use to reduce costs include: (1) reducing
health care utilization by enrollees relative to usage by enrollees in fee-for-service plans; (2)
negotiating with contracting providers to pay less for services than fee-for-service plans would
pay; and (3) "enrolling relatively healthy people who have need for fewer services." Id
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providers17 in return for an assurance of higher patient volume.1 8
Providers, seeing their patients enroll in managed care plans in
increasing numbers, feel an economic imperative to contract with as
many managed care arrangements as possible. 9  The result: an
increasingly competitive, and litigious, health care marketplace."
Not surprisingly, the number of antitrust cases involving HMOs has
risen in the last twenty-five years as HMOs have become popular
alternatives among consumers and profitable ventures for providers
and insurers.21 The increase in the number of cases appears to
correspond with the rise in HMO enrollment.2 These cases general-
ly fall into four categories. The first category consists of monopoly
actions, including those brought by: (1) one HMO against another
17. HMOs negotiate with diversely structured groups of health providers over price and
terms of membership on HMO panels. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, 1996 STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,153, at 20,826-35 [hereinafter DOJ & FTC, ENFORCEMENT POLICY]. These
groups are divided into two basic categories for purposes of antitrust review. (1) those involving
"horizontal" agreements between or among competitors; and (2) those involving "vertical"
agreements between or among parties that are not competitors. See id. at 20,828. Each type of
group has a different competitive impact and is viewed by enforcers under varying levels of
scrutiny. See id.
18. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589,591 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating
that HMOs negotiate lower payment rates with health providers who, in turn, become members
of plan's panel and receive higher patient volume).
19. SeeDavid R. Olmos & Michael A. Hiltzik, Doctors'Authority, Pay Dwindle Under HMOs, LA
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995, at Al (describing extreme pressure on doctors to join managed care
networks to maintain needed patient base, and loss of autonomy once in network).
20. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (comparing rise in HMO-related antitrust
litigation to rise in nationwide HMO enrollment).
21. ALEXIS search of federal cases reveals that HMOs were involved in 50 cases brought
to trial in federal courts involving antitrust claims under the Sherman or Clayton Acts from
January 1, 1970 to January 1, 1994. For the 30-month period from January 1, 1994 to July 1,
1996, the search revealed 12 cases, or a six-year average of approximately 50 cases. The search
was performed in five six-year increments and yielded the following results:
January 1, 1970 to January 1, 1976 No cases
January 1, 1976 toJanuary 1, 1982 9 cases
January 1, 1982 to January 1, 1988 13 cases (a 45% increase)
January 1, 1988 to January 1, 1994 28 cases (a 115% increase)
January 1, 1994 to July 1, 1996 50 cases (an 80% increase).
(six-year average)
Search ofLEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts File (search criteria: antitrust and (health maintenance
organization or HMO) and (Sherman or Clayton)).
22. Enrollment in HlMOs and other types of managed care as a percentage of overall private
insurance coverage increased from approximately 27% in 1988 to 65% in 1993. SeePROSPECrivE
PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 9, at 23. Overall enrollment in managed care
increased 2200% between 1970 and 1995. See supra note 3 (citing studies plotting HMO
enrollment from early 1970s to January 1995). HMO enrollment increased at an annual rate
of 9.2% from January 1, 1994, to January 1, 1995. See 1995 INTERSTUDY REPORT, supra note 3,
at 1.
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for foreclosure of the market;23 (2) HMOs against large insurers;24
or (3) health care providers against large insurers for adopting cost-
containment strategies involving some elements of managed care.
25
The second category includes actions for tying arrangements brought
by: (1) a small HMO against a larger HMO; 26 or (2) physicians
against hospitals.27 The third category encompasses actions for group
boycotts brought by: (1) doctors against hospitals for exclusion from
medical staff;2 (2) hospitals against insurers for exclusion from a
payment plan;29 or (3) HMOs and other payors against providers for
23. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United ofWis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1411-13
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding HMO not liable for monopolization because of lack of market power
within relevant product market), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); U.S. Healthcare 986 F.2d at
597-99 (finding that HMO lacked sufficient market power within relevant product market to
form monopoly).
24. See Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of RI., 883
F.2d 1101, 1109-11 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding insurer not liable in suit brought by HMO under
Sherman Act § 2 for setting maximum insurance reimbursement at no greater than payment by
competing HMO).
25. See Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335-36 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that formation of preferred provider organization ("PPO") by large insurer did
not violate Sherman Act § 2 in suit brought by hospital because, inter alia, ease of entry for
competing HMOs prevented attainment of market power); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc.,
749 F.2d 922, 927, 933 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that despite market power, insurer's prohibition
of "balance billing" by participating physicians does not violate Sherman Act § 2 unless payments
fall so low as to constitute predatory pricing).
26. See Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 95-1698, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6480, at *16-22 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1996) (denying motion for summary judgment by
defendant HMO, U.S. Healthcare, and holding that plaintiff HMO, Brokerage Concepts,
presented "legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find" that U.S. Healthcare
implemented tying arrangement to obtain enrollees).
27. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,31-32 (1984) (holding hospital
not liable for tying arrangement in violation of Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2 after hospital awarded
exclusive contract for anesthesiology services to group practice). A tying arrangement occurs
when a supplier uses market power over one product to attain power or to otherwise manipulate
competition over another product. See id. at 12-13 (citing Former Enters. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 512-14 (1969) (White,J., dissenting)). Such an arrangement exists when
the practice in question "link[s] two distinct markets for products that were distinguishable in
the eyes of buyers." Id. at 19 (citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 600 (1953)).
28. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 815 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding physician members
of hospital medical staff liable for Sherman Act § I group boycott after they denied peer medical
staff privileges at hospital, but finding medical staff incapable of conspiring with hospital). But
see Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 851 F.2d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that hospital
and medical staff are legally capable of conspiring in Sherman Act § 1 violation). Although the
courts in Weiss and Bolt based their analyses primarily on Sherman Act section 1, group boycotts
also are prohibited by section 3 of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
29. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 965-66 (10th Cir.
1990) (finding insurer liable for horizontal group boycott in violation of Sherman Act § 1 under
rule of reason when it threatened to terminate contract of hospital recently acquired by
competitor and lowered reimbursement of other providers doing business with competitor).
But see U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 592-93 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding
HMO not liable for horizontal group boycott under per se analysis when it offered higher
reimbursement to physicians for agreeing not to provide services to any other HMOs).
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attempting to inhibit the entry of managed care into the market.3 °
The fourth category comprises actions for market division or price-fixing
by an HMO, preferred provider organization ("PPO"), or insurer."'
Although some of these cases do not directly involve HMOs as parties,
many have resulted from the increased concentration HMOs have
brought to the health care financing market
32
These actions, with few exceptions, 3 have in common a single
threshold requirement: a defendant will not be found liable for
30. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-66 (1986) (holding that group
of dentists violated Sherman Act § 1 when it concertedly refused to provide x-rays to insurers).
The Court in Indiana Federation of Dentists struggled with the question of whether the case fit into
the group boycott "pigeonhole," id. at 458, or whether it was a price-fixing case. See id. at 459-
61. The Court, however, was interested more in avoiding application of a strict per se test than
in finding a perfect label for the case. See id. at 458-59. Ultimately, the Court found that it was
"not a matter of any great difficulty" to apply a rule of reason balancing test to the facts of the
case. Id. at 459. The Court thereby engaged in an early application of what now is known as
the "quick look" test for determining violations of Sherman Act section 1. See U.S. Healthcare
986 F.2d at 594 (citing Indiana Fed'n of Dentists as early example of "quick look" formulation).
Another line of cases involves suits brought by the FTC against the American Medical
Association ("AMA") for its attempts to suppress the growth of HMOs and against other health
care financing arrangements that restrict choice of provider or promote fee discounts. See BARRY
R. FuRROW ET" AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 868-69 (2d ed. 1991); see also
AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 526 (1943) (holding that AMA violated Sherman Act § 3,
which applies Sherman Act § 1 to District of Columbia, when it prevented physicians from
accepting employment with or consulting for staff-model HMO); AMA v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 450
(2d Cir. 1980) (holding AMA liable for violation of § 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994), when it adopted ethical guidelines discouraging participation in
managed care arrangements), aff'd by an equally divided cour4 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
31. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-57 (1982) (holding
doctor-initiated PPO liable for per se offense of price fixing under Sherman Act § 1, after
physician members of PPO comprising 70% of all those practicing in county, set maximum
reimbursement rates); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d
1406, 1415-16 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding HMO liable for per se offense of market division and
price fixing in violation of Sherman Act § 1), cer. denieA 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); cf DOJ & FTC,
ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 17, at 20,826 (acknowledging that price fixing and market
division are illegal per se, but noting that rule of reason applies to some arrangements under
which competitors integrate economically to form joint venture).
32. See Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that
there was no group boycott in violation of § 1 of Sherman Act when partnership of radiologists
was excluded from exclusive contract to provide services for hospital). Exclusion of the
parmership followed closely on the heels of the partnership's expansion of services to include
services formerly available only to inpatients at the Healthtrust-owned hospital. See id. at 1390.
The reason for the partnership's expansion ofservices was to attract HMO and PPO clients. See
id.
33. Price fixing and market division generally are held to be illegal per se under Sherman
Act section 1. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). This rule
obviates the need for a plaintiff to show that a defendant possessed market power and eliminates
defenses based on reasonableness. See id. at 218. Courts, however, frequently engage in a
balancing inquiry to determine whether a certain action can be properly characterized as price
fixing. See HALL & ELLMAN, supra note 13, at 212-13 (describing weaknesses of Maricopa County
holding). The Court in Maricopa County held a price fixing agreement to be illegal as a matter
of law when prices charged by a physician group were set by members of the group. See id. On
remand, however, the district court held that the arrangement was no longer a price-fixing
agreement worthy of per se prohibition when consumers were placed on the price-setting
committee. See id.
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antitrust offenses unless it is shown to possess "market power." 4
Market power is defined as "the ability of a firm (or a group of firms,
actingjointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing
so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and
must be rescinded." 5 Such power can be assessed only after a
"market" has been appropriately designated. 6 The ability to define
the relevant product market 7 and determine market power within
that market,3" therefore, is crucial to virtually all antitrust actions in
the health care field.
Courts, to date, have held that HMOs operate within the "health
care financing market," which includes traditional indemnity
insurance, 9 PPOs,4" and other forms of payment for health
34. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26, 29 (1984) (requiring
showing of market power for per se liability to attach under Clayton Act § 3 for tying
arrangement, and finding insufficient evidence of market power); Reazin, 899 F.2d at 965-66
(applying rule of reason and marketpower assessment to find insurer liable for horizontal group
boycott in violation of Sherman Act § 1 when insurer terminated contract of hospital recently
acquired by competitor and discouraged other health service providers from doing business with
competing insurers as condition of reimbursement); Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc.
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1109-11 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding insurer not
liable in suit brought by HMO under Sherman Act § 2 for setting maximum insurance
reimbursement at no greater than payment by competing HMO, despite existence of market
power); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc. 784 F.2d 1325, 1330, 1334-35 (7th Cir.
1986) (requiring market power for violation of Sherman Act § 2, but finding that defendant
lacked market power in medical insurance when market share was 27% of patients in Indiana);
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 749 F.2d 922, 924 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding no violation by insurer
of Sherman Act § 2 for setting maximum reimbursement amount, despite 74% market share).
But see Marshfld. 65 F.3d at 1415-16 (finding HMO liable for market division and price fixing
in violation of Sherman Act § 1 under per se analysis, without market power analysis).
35. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Powerin Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV.
937, 937 (1981).
36. See Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1805, 1806-07 (1990) (asserting that definition of relevant product market is
crucial to antitrust analysis because determination of liability rests on whether firm has power
to raise price above competitive levels without losing customers to competitors operating in same
market).
37. See Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 938 (stating that first step in proving market
power is defining relevant product and geographic market).
38. See FURROW ET AL, supra note 30, at 787-88 ("The concept of market power is critical
to most [Sherman Act] Section 1 and all Section 2 claims.").
39. Traditional "indemnity" health insurance differs substantially from managed care.
Indemnity plans reimburse (or "indemnify") the patient for money spent to receive covered
health care services up to a specified dollar threshold. See HIAA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3,
at 1-2. Coverage under traditional indemnity plans typically extends to accidents and illnesses;
preventive health care is not emphasized. See id. at 2 (describing coverage under early
indemnity plans as extending to "common accidents and illnesses" and later expanding to
include "extended illnesses or long hospital stays," but not including preventive health care).
40. The PPO is a form of managed care that combines elements of HMO and traditional
indemnity coverage. See HIAA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 20. It offers more flexibility than
an HMO by giving consumers greater freedom to choose providers, while achieving some savings
by directing patients to a network of providers. See id. Under a PPO arrangement, an insurer
contracts with a panel of providers who provide medical services and agree to be paid according
to a negotiated rate. See id, Enrollees typically are allowed to receive care from providers who
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care.41 HMOs hold a comparatively low market share when viewed
as a component of this broadly defined market and are therefore
deemed to have low market power.42  The process of defining a
relevant product market and assessing market power, however, is
especially problematic in fields exhibiting major innovations and
rapidly changing products.43 Health care financing has experienced
precisely these kinds of changes over the past quarter-century.44 This
market evolution, coupled with recent Supreme Court precedent for
assessing antitrust liability in sophisticated but imperfect markets,
threatens to increase the ease with which HMOs can obtain market
power, thereby exposing HMOs to an increased risk of antitrust
liability.
Part I of this Comment describes the statutory basis for antitrust
offenses and the traditional methods for measuring market power and
defining product markets. Part II examines how the Supreme Court's
decisions in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc." and
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde46 raise the threat of
antitrust liability for HMOs by lowering the threshold for finding
market power in product markets exhibiting imperfections similar to
are not members of the network; however, there is a financial penalty associated with such care.
See id. PPOs frequently do not exercise the same level of control over health care utilization as
HMOs. SeeAMERICAN MANAGED CARE REVIEW ASSOCIATION, 1994-1995 MANAGED HEALTH CARE
OVERVIEW 6 (1995).
41. See generally Blue Cross & Blue Shield United ofWis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406,
1411 (7th Cir. 1995) (overturningjury verdict and stating that "[w]e thus do not believe that
a reasonable jury... could find that HMOs constitute a separate market" from other health
care financing products), cert. denieA 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding lower court ruling that "health
care financing is the product market"); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins. Co., 784
F.2d 1325, 1329 (7th Cir. 1986) (considering HMOs to be method of "health care financing"
and stating that the HMO "is both a method ofjoining physicians in a firm ... and financing
their service by selling memberships for stated monthly prices"). But see Brokerage Concepts,
Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 95-1698, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6480, at *18-*19 (E.D. Pa. May
14, 1996) (holding that relevant product market includes all members of single HMO with
prescription drug benefits (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 482 (1992))).
42. See U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 599 ("[P]lainly, Healthsource has no monopoly or
anything close to it, given the number of other providers in New Hampshire, such as insurers,
staff HMOs, Blue Cross/Blue Shield and individual doctors."); cf. MarshfeIl 65 F.3d at 1409
(stating that defendant HMO did not monopolize HMO services because HMOs are not a
market).
43. SeeJoseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1121-
22 (1983) (contending that legal rule governing antitrust liability in innovative industries is
inherently difficult to articulate because it must balance public policies encouraging competition
and innovation with those discouraging monopolistic behavior).
44. See supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text (explaining rise of HMOs as alternative
health care financing product over past 25 years and describing innovative techniques employed
by HMOs to effect change in price and quality of health care).
45. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
46. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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those in the health care financing market. Part III examines how the
lower courts have assessed HMO antitrust liability and applied
principles of market definition and market power. Part IV discusses
how imperfections in the health care financing market could enable
small firms to exert market power under the Kodak analysis, thereby
increasing the risk of antitrust liability for HMOs. Part IV further
analyzes how these market imperfections, coupled with current trends
in HMO enrollment and provider contracting, could reduce elasticity
of supply and demand for HMOs, causing the HMO market to
diverge from the health care financing market under traditional
principles of market definition.
Part V recommends two legal principles, which, if adopted by
courts, would reduce the ability of HMOs to obtain market power
illegally and would reduce the threat that antitrust enforcement will
undo the efficiencies HMOs have introduced to the health care
financing marketplace. First, courts should combine the Kodak
analysis, focusing on market imperfections that reduce elasticity of
demand, with that of Jefferson Parish, focusing on elasticity of supply.
Under such a hybrid analysis, antitrust liability can attach only where
a firm: (1) exploits market imperfections; (2) exhibits the ability to
raise prices above the competitive level; and (3) impedes entry of new
competitors into the market. Second, in defining markets and
assessing market power, courts should adhere to a fact-based, rather
than assumption-based, analysis. Such a fact-based analysis emphasizes
inquiry into market realities overjudicial assumptions about markets.
Part V also recommends a series of economic solutions to remedy
market imperfections and lessen the possibility that unwarranted
findings of market power will lead to HMO antitrust liability. These
recommendations include: (1) lowering "switching costs," or the cost
to consumers of changing health plans, through passage of legislation
to eliminate pre-existing condition exclusions; (2) preserving supply
elasticity through adoption of public policies that decrease adverse
selection by HMOs; and (3) preserving demand elasticity by increasing
the availability of comparative information about competing health
plans through employer policies requiring uniform benefits. Finally,
Part V recommends a series of actions to be taken by HMOs in order
to avoid liability under antitrust laws.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Basis for Antitrust Offenses
Federal antitrust law has developed primarily around two substan-
tive statutes: the Sherman Antitrust Act 7 and the Clayton Antitrust
Act.48 The Sherman Act identifies and prohibits two basic categories
of anticompetitive conduct: that of a single firm, proscribed by
section 2 of the Sherman Act,49 and that of a combination of firms,
proscribed by section 1.50 A firm found liable for anticompetitive
conduct under the Sherman Act is guilty of a felony.5 The Clayton
Act supplements the broad language of the Sherman Act by making
four enumerated practices illegal,52 although not criminal.53 The
Clayton Act additionally supplies a private right of action under which
any individual alleging "antitrust injury" can sue for anticompetitive
conduct prohibited by either the Sherman or Clayton Act. 4 The
Department ofJustice ("DOJ") is charged with public enforcement of
the Sherman Act, 5 while both DOJ and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("FTC") are charged with public enforcement of the Clayton
Act.5 6  In addition, the FTC is authorized to bring actions for
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994). Although the Act has been amended repeatedly since its
adoption, its two primary provisions, sections 1 and 2, remain substantially intact. Compare 26
Stat. 209 (1890) (providing original language of Sherman Act), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (providing
current language of Sherman Act).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
49. See id. § 2. Specifically, section 2 states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " Id.
50. See id. § 1. Specifically, section 1 states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ....
Id.
51. See id. (making combined activities of individual firms in restraint of trade a felony); id.
§ 2 (making monopolization of trade a felony).
52. See id. §§ 13-19. Enumerated practices made illegal by the Clayton Act are: (1) price
discrimination, see id. § 13(a); (2) tying and exclusive dealing contracts, see id. § 14; (3)
acquisition of competitors, see id. § 18; and (4) sharing of board members among competing
firms, see id. § 19.
53. See ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLAM E. KovAcIc, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 29 (4th
ed. 1994).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . .
55. See id. § 4 (charging U.S. Attorney General with responsibility for enforcement of
provisions of Sherman Act).
56. See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 53, at 29.
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violation of the Sherman Act by virtue of its authority under the
Federal Trade Commission ActY
7
B. Judicial Construction of Antitrust Laws
The nebulous words of the antitrust statutes reflect the ambivalence
of Congress and the courts toward resolving the inherent tensions
between incentive, efficiency, and competition in the free market. 8
Through the Act's open-ended provisions,59 Congress granted the
courts broad discretion to interpret antitrust laws and develop the
principles for their enforcement." This wide berth has allowed
courts, over nearly a century, to develop manifold tests to determine
whether liability will attach under the Acts for various types of
behavior.6 Moreover, judicial construction has led to the establish-
ment of different standards for reviewing potentially anticompetitive
behavior.
6 2
1. Monopolization and attempted monopolization: section 2 offenses
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits the monopolization of
trade.63 Courts apply a two-pronged test to determine whether a
defendant has violated this section of the Sherman Act. The test asks
first whether a defendant has "market power" in the relevant product
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. Section 5 of the FTC Act, declares unlawful "unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45. The Court conferred jurisdiction on the FTC to enforce the
Sherman Act by holding that "unfair methods of competition" include violations of the Sherman
Act. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
58. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (evaluating
monopoly action brought against ALCOA under Sherman Act). Judge Learned Hand observed:
"Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative,
discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and
rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to
counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone." Id. at 427.
Judge Hand acknowledged conversely that "[a] single producer may be the survivor out of
a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry....
[Such a] successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when
he wins." I& at 430.
59. Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court that "[a]s a charter of freedom, the
[Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,359-60 (1933).
60. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386 (1956) (noting
that 'Judicial construction of antitrust legislation generally has been left unchanged by
Congress").
61. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593 (noting that plaintiff
can prevail under same facts in antitrust action by establishing claim under any one of several
rubrics).
62. See du Pont, 351 U.S. at 386-87 (declaring that there is no inconsistency between Court's
standard requiring examination of particular circumstances and judicial theory making some
agreements and practices invalid per se).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (making monopolization of trade a felony).
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market.' Courts traditionally have used market share as a proxy for
market power' in evaluating this prerequisite to a section 2 of-
fense.66 The second element of a section 2 offense is anticompeti-
tive conduct.67 The purpose of this requirement is to guard against
"the willful acquisition of... power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident."'  A firm satisfies this element when it acquires
monopoly power through unlawful means or wields such power to
prevent or impede competition.69 A monopolist who innocently
obtains market power is liable, therefore, only if it uses the power to
restrain competition; 70 a monopolist who does not exercise market
power in an anticompetitive fashion is liable only if it obtained such
power through anticompetitive means.7'
Section 2 also prohibits attempted monopolization. This offense
includes three elements:72  (1) specific intent to control prices or
destroy competition within a particular area of commerce; (2)
64. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451,481 (1992) (enumerat-
ing prerequisites to § 2 violation).
65. The "market share proxy" is the traditional test employed by courts to determine
whether a defendant has market power. SeeJacobs, supra note 11, at 342 & n.26 (noting that
market share has been used as proxy for market power since Judge Learned Hand's seminal
decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)). Under the test,
a court considers the percent of market share a defendant holds. See id. at 424. If the
defendant holds a dominant share of the product market, the court likely will find that it has
market power if the defendant holds an insubstantial share of the market, the court likely will
hold that it does not have market power. See id.
66. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 6.5, at 168 n.2
(student ed. 1985). Compare Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc. 784 F.2d 1325,
1335 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming lower court's finding that defendant lacked market power in
medical insurance when market share was 27% of patients in Indiana, new firms could enter
market easily, existing firms could expand sales quickly, and there were no barriers to entry),
with Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 969-70 (10th Cir. 1990)
(finding defendant had market power in medical insurance, because barrier to entry by
competitors was evidenced by 62% market share of patients in Kansas).
67. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (describing second element of § 2 claim as "willful
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power").
68. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, 576 (1966) (holding firm liable
for § 2 offense when it acquired 87% of nation's centralized home protection service market
through market allocation, discriminatory pricing designed to eliminate competition, and
acquisition of competitors).
69. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Inc., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979)
(recounting elements of § 2 offense in claim against Kodak for monopolization of film, color
print paper, and camera markets (citing Grinne/l 384 U.S. at 570-71)); see also California
Computer Prods. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that there are three
elements to § 2 antitrust claim: (1) possession of monopoly power; (2) willful acquisition or
maintenance of power, and (3) causally related antitrust injury).
70. See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 272.
71. See id. at 272-74.
72. See California Computer Prods., 613 F.2d at 736 (recounting elements of attempted
monopolization in claim against IBM for redesigning its computer products to make them
incompatible with peripherals manufactured by competitors (citing Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953))).
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predatory or anticompetitive conduct aimed at accomplishing the
unlawful purpose; and (3) a dangerous probability of success.73 The
first element of the offense, specific intent, need not be proved
through direct evidence, but can be shown through proof of a per se
offense under section 1' The second element, anticompetitive
conduct, requires only a showing of some illegal or predatory
activity.75 The third element can be proved either through direct
evidence of market power 76 or by inference from proof of specific
intent.77 Because a dangerous probability of success can be demon-
strated merely by satisfying the first or second element of the offense,
independent proof of the third element is not always essential to
establishing attempted monopolization.
78
2. Combinations or contracts in restraint of trade: section 1 offenses
All contracts or combinations restr/ain trade to some degree.
79
Courts, therefore, have interpreted section 1 to prohibit
only "unreasonable" restraints of trade." To determine what
constitutes an "unreasonable" restraint of trade, courts have devel-
oped three tests: (1) the rule of reason;8" (2) the quick look
73. The court in California Computer Prods. added a fourth element, causal antitrust injury,
to the analysis. See California Computer Prods., 613 F.2d at 736. This element, however, is not
relevant to the subject of this Comment and therefore is not discussed.
74. See id. at 737 (holding direct evidence "not always necessary" when claim is based on
Sherman Act § 1 violation).
75. See id. (noting that predatory or anticompetitive conduct element encompasses more




79. See FuRoW Er AL, supra note 30, at 786 (observing that all contracts between buyers
and sellers limit availability of goods to other buyers).
80. See id.
81. The rule of reason is applied by courts in evaluating most group boycotts and tying
arrangements alleged under section 1. SeeU.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d
589,593 &n.2 (IstCir. 1993) (noting that tying typically is scrutinized under rule of reason, and
that group boycotts are viewed under rule of reason unless they involve "secondary boycotts").
This test balances the efficiencies of concentration against the anticompetitive effects of a
contract or combination. See HALL & ELLMAN, supra note 13, at 192-93 (citing Board of Trade
of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1918)). Justice Brandeis first articulated the
rule of reason in his oft-quoted passage in Board of Trade of Chicago.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business... ; its condition before and after the restraint wvas
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
Id. at 238. The rule of reason today remains substantially the same, applying a multifactored
analysis to alleged antitrust offenses. See FUiOW ET AL., supra note 30, at 786 (noting that
courts conduct broader examination of competitive factors under rule of reason and citing Board
of Trade of Chicago as "classic articulation" of test).
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formulation; 2 and (3) the per se test.83 Courts scrutinize potential-
ly anticompetitive activities under one of these three tests depending
on how great a threat to competition the activity poses.' A defen-
dant must possess market power before antitrust liability will attach
under section 1 according to all but the per se test."' Courts
evaluating antitrust liability under section 1 traditionally have
employed the same market share proxy used in section 2 to deter-
mine whether a defendant possesses market power.86
C. Recent Application of Antitrust Law to HMOs
Courts and regulators to date generally have viewed HMO markets
as transitional, allowing them to develop free from close antitrust
82. The quick look test is a relatively recent formulation under which courts consider
procompetitive justifications for allegedly anticompetitive behavior before deciding whether to
apply the per se label. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 30, at 787. Similarly, courts occasionally
use the "quick look"justification to curtail proceedings under the "rule of reason" after finding
convincing proof that a specific behavior unreasonably restrains trade and is devoid of any
legitimate justification. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (holding that
concerted refusal by dentists to provide insurer with x-rays for purpose of reviewing effectiveness
of treaunent was so clearly without quality of care or business benefit as to warrant finding of
liability without reaching question of market definition or market power); see also U.S. Healthcare,
986 F.2d at 593 n.2 (interpreting Kodak as possible example of application of "quasi per se" or
quick look test to tying arrangement).
83. The per se label is reserved for behavior so likely to have an anticompetitive effect that
no exploration of its justification is warranted. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 30, at 786. Today,
the only behaviors that qualify for per se illegality are: (1) price or output fixing agreements,
see U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 593 & n.2 (noting that price or output fixing agreements are per
se illegal, but that group boycotts can be viewed as per se illegal only if they involve "secondary
boycotts"); (2) market division, seeBlue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic,
65 F.3d 1406, 1416-17 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding jury verdict finding defendant liable for
market division), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); and (3) horizontal, secondary group
boycotts, see U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 593 (noting that per se approach is applied properly to
horizontal arrangements between providers of health care if they involve "secondary boycotts").
A secondary boycott occurs when competitors refuse to do business with a third party, such
as a distributor or supplier, if it serves another competitor whom they seek to harm. SeeFashion
Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461-62 (1941) (describing arrangement
whereby competing designers of clothing agreed not to sell to manufacturers or retailers who
dealt with producers of design "copies"). The rule of reason, however, is applied appropriately
to vertical arrangements among apparent competitors operating at different levels ofproduction.
See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (distinguishing boycott
from situations in which there is exclusive dealership arrangement or refusal of single trader to
deal with another).
84. See FURROW Er AL., supra note 30, at 786. Activities proscribed by section 1 include
group boycotts, tying arrangements, price fixing, and market division. See U.S. Healthcare, 986
F.2d at 593 & n.2 (evaluating appropriateness of applying rule of reason, quick look, and per
se test to determine whether various activities violate Sherman Act § 1).
85. See FURROW Er AL, supra note 30, at 787 (stating that market power is crucial to most
claims under Sherman Act § 1).
86. See Ud. (stating that market power is essential to all claims under Sherman Act § 2 and
that courts traditionally use market share as proxy for market power).
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scrutiny.87 This is at least partly due to the fact that competition on
a large scale among health plans is a new feature in health care
markets.8" In recent years, competition has led to massive growth and
consolidation by HMOs in order to maximize economies of scale and
resources available to customers.8 9 Both the FTC and DOJ have
acknowledged the dramatic changes in the health care market.0 In
response, they have published joint guidelines to help those involved
with managed care steer clear of antitrust liability.9' Enforcement
under these guidelines, however, has been relatively relaxed.92 As
the health care market matures, this permissive attitude may
eventually yield to a more aggressive approach by enforcers, 9 as well
as successful challenges to HMO behavior under antitrust laws.94
87. See DOJ & FTC, ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 17, at 20,799 (explaining that joint
enforcement guidelines were introduced to guide health care providers through time of
"tremendous change," and to prevent any chilling effect"the problem of uncertainty... [might
have on] activities that could lower health care costs"); Holman W.Jenkins, Jr., Business World:
In Pursuit of Price-F-ixing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1996, at A19 ("In the medical business ...
trustbusters seem to favor a world in which mighty buyers are posed against small, cloutless
sellers.").
88. See Enthoven, supra note 4, at 45-46 (describing resurgent popularity in 1992 of
.managed competition"-or "value for money competition-as means to lower health care costs).
89. See Ron Winslow & Leslie Scism, Aetna Agrees to Acquire U.S. Heathcare; Pact for $8.9
Billion in Cash and Stock Mill Create Leader in lanaged Care, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1996, at A2
(reporting that acquisition will result in creation of managed health care company serving 23
million people).
90. SeeDOJ & FTC, ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 17, at 20,799 (observing that "health
care markets have continued to evolve in response to consumer demand and competition in the
marketplace").
91. See id. Although the DOJ & FTC guidelines do not directly address the activities of
HMOs, Statement 9 of the Enforcement Policy establishes "Analytical Principles Relating to
Multiprovider Networks." Id at 20,826-35. This Statement establishes principles for review of
arrangements that closely resemble and deal directly with HMOs, to be used to determine
compliance with antitrust laws. See id. The Statement addresses: (1) issues associated with the
formation of provider networks, see id. at 20,831; and (2) market definition, see id. at 20,828.
92. See David Burda, Docs Get Their Way: Under AMA Attack Feds Back Off Antitrust
Enforcement, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 8, 1996, at 40 (reporting that DOJ and FTC gave
antitrust clearance to 19 of 23 business arrangements addressed since adoption of Joint
Enforcement Policy). The FTC cleared nine of 13 deals among providers it reviewed, and the
DOJ cleared all 10 of the deals it reviewed. See id. at 41; see also DOJ & FTC, ENFORCEMENT
POLICY, supra note 17, at 20,827-31 (stressing agencies' intent to apply rule of reason to both
horizontal and vertical arrangements among health providers).
93. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, States of Wisconsin, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas, Washington and West Virginia in Support of Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Marshfield
Brief of Amicus Curiae] (urging Court to grant certiorari to Seventh Circuit and to reverse
decision weakening ability of attorneys general to prosecute under antitrust laws).
94. See Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 95-1698, 1996 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 6480 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1996) (rejecting defendant U.S. Healthcare's motion for
judgment as matter of law and paving way for $1.2 million jury verdict in suit against HMO for
tying arrangement); Leslie Scism, U.S. Healthcare Rival Is Awarded $1.2 Million in Antitrust Verdic,
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II. LOWERING THE LEGAL THRESHOLD FOR ANTITRUST LIABILrTY
A. Lowering the Threshold for Market Power
1. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.
The U.S. Supreme Court departed from the previously clear
standard of using market share as the proxy for market power in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc." In so doing, it
lowered the threshold for finding that small firms possess market
powerY
6
The Court in Kodak affirmed the denial of a motion for summary
judgment by the defendant, Eastman Kodak Company,97 holding
that Kodak could be liable for antitrust violations despite the fact that
Kodak possessed only a two to twenty-three percent share in the
photocopying equipment market." Prior to Kodak, the Supreme
Court had never attributed market power to a firm with less than a
fifty percent market share.99 In turning away from the market share
proxy, the Court disregarded precedent dating back to at least
19 45 .1°°
WALL ST.J., May 23, 1996, at B2 (reporting verdict for plaintiff in antitrust suit brought against
U.S. Healthcare for tying arrangement).
95. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
96. SeeJacobs, supra note 11, at 355-62 (describing Court's movement from traditional
market share measurement to new form of market power assessment).
97. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,486 (1992), aff'g903
F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), revk 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,402 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
98. Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612,616 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990)
(noting that defendant Kodak had market share of 23% of high-volume copier market, 20% of
micrographic equipment market, and less than 2% of plain-paper copier market), affd, 504 U.S.
451 (1992).
99. SeeJacobs, supra note 11, at 342 n.27; see also Bloch & Falk, supra note 10, at 212 (noting
that, under current case law, plan serving less than 30% of consumers in given market is not
likely to pose threat of gaining and exercising market power).
100. SeeJacobs, supra note 11, at 342 & n.26 (noting that market share has been used as
proxy for market power since Judge Learned Hand's seminal decision in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)). The court in Aluminum Co. of Am. held that
90% market share constitutes market power, 60% to 64% likely does not, and less than 33%
market share is insufficient to constitute market power. See id. at 424; cf. William E. Kovacic,
Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for
Deconcentration, 74 IowA L. REv. 1105, 1112-20 (1989) (describing cyclical nature of this country's
.efforts to use the Sherman Act to achieve its deconcentration goals ... when... litigation has
entered a state of lasting repose"). American jurisprudence has entered three discrete periods
characterized by government initiatives to deconcentrate industry in the twentieth century: (1)
1904-1920, see id. at 1112-16; (2) 1937-1956, see id. at 1116-19; and (3) 1969-1982, see id. at 1119-
20. Each period followed on the heels of government permissiveness toward the growth of large
frms and events that served to discredit the benefits of large concentrations of economic power.
See id. at 1120.
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The Court's purpose in employing a new test for market power was
to gain the ability to review potentially anticompetitive behavior by
small firms in markets where rational economic explanations, while
"perhaps intuitively appealing, may not accurately explain the
behavior of the [market].""' Under the market share proxy, small
firms escaped review for violations of antitrust law because they failed
to satisfy the threshold requirement of market power. The Court in
Kodak acknowledged that, in markets made imperfect by certain
economic factors, even small firms could possess market power,
adopting anticompetitive policies" 2 or raising prices above competi-
tive levels.103
The plaintiffs in Kodak were independent service organizations
("ISO") that repaired and maintained Kodak photocopying equip-
ment.' 4 Kodak also serviced its own copiers, providing eighty to
ninety-five percent of the maintenance for its machines.'0 5 Kodak
provided these services through annual contracts or on a per-call basis
after the initial warranty on its equipment expired. 0 6  It did not
offer a complete package of equipment and maintenance with the
initial sale of its equipment, including lifetime parts and service for
a single price.
0 7
The ISOs provided parts and services to owners of Kodak equip-
ment through arrangements similar to those offered by Kodak but at
substantially lower prices.1' s ISOs obtained Kodak parts in several
ways, including: (1) purchasing them directly from Kodak; (2)
purchasing them from independent original-equipment manufacturers
("OEM") who made parts to order for Kodak; (3) reconditioning
parts stripped from old Kodak machines; and (4) using parts
purchased from Kodak by customers.' 9 In response to the competi-
101. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473.
102. See id, at 459 (stating that plaintiffs brought suit, in part, for illegal "tying arrange-
ment"). Finding the existence of a tying arrangement, the Court sought to determine whether
the arrangement could be characterized as "illegal." See id at 464. It thus examined whether
Kodak had market power, or the power to "'force a purchaser to do something that he would
not do in a competitive market.'" Id. (quotingJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 14 (1984)).
103. See id. at 470-71 (observing that increased revenues from supracompetitive pricing could
more than offset lost revenues from decreased sales); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 35,
at 937 (defining "market power" as "the ability of a firm or group of firms, actingjointly to raise
the price above competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase
is unprofitable and must be rescinded").
104. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 455.




109. See id. at 458 & n.2.
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tive threat from the ISOs, Kodak implemented several policies
designed to inhibit ISOs from selling their services to owners of
Kodak machines."1 These policies included selling replacement
parts only to owners of Kodak equipment who subscribed to Kodak
service arrangements1 1 and forging agreements with OEMs to
prevent them from selling Kodak-compatible parts to anyone but
Kodak.
112
The ISOs brought suit against Kodak, alleging that its policies
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.11 3 Specifically, an ISO
customer seeking to buy replacement parts for a Kodak machine
could do so only if it purchased unwanted repair and maintenance
services from Kodak."4 The ISOs alleged that, under section 1,
these policies "tied" the sale of Kodak services to the sale of Kodak
parts."5 Under section 2, the ISOs alleged that Kodak had attempt-
ed to monopolize the sale of service for Kodak machines by imple-
menting its "parts and service policies as part of a scheme of willful
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power."' 6
In finding that Kodak could possess power in the "after market" for
parts and services despite its low market share in the photocopier
market, the Court placed great emphasis on the existence of two
imperfections in the market for photocopiers: information deficien-
cies and high switching costs.1 7 The Court, evaluating the availabili-
ty of information, noted that Kodak's method of pricing service and
parts separately from the initial sale of its machines prevented
prospective purchasers from obtaining an accurate estimate of the
"lifecycle" cost of a Kodak photocopier."8 Although consumers
could accurately assess the cost of the initial purchase of a Kodak
machine, information on the cost of servicing the machine over its
lifetime was "difficult[-if not] impossible-to acquire at the time of
purchase."" 9 As a result, Kodak could charge subcompetitive prices
110. See id. at 458.
111. Seeid.
112. See i.
113. See i. at 459.
114. See id. at 464 (postulating that Kodak had "more than sufficient power in the parts
market to force unwanted purchases of the tied market, service").
115. See id. at 459.
116. Id. at 483.
117. See id. at 473 (noting that "existence of significant information and switching costs" are
"forceful" reasons for finding market power in absence of high market share).
118. See id.
119. 1& Information necessary to arrive at an accurate lifecycle price includes "data on price,
quality and availability of products needed to operate, upgrade, or enhance the initial
equipment, as well as service and repair costs, including estimates of breakdown frequency,
nature of repairs, price of service and parts, length of 'down-time' and losses incurred from
110
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for equipment, while recapturing the difference by charging supra-
competitive prices later as the sole supplier of parts and service. 2 °
In addition, the Court found that high switching costs contributed
to Kodak's ability to exercise market power.12' It noted that "the
heavy initial outlay for Kodak equipment" made the cost of switching
to a competing product "very high" for Kodak customers. 122 The
Court observed that "consumers who already have purchased the
equipment, and are thus 'locked in,' will tolerate some level of
service-price increases before changing equipment brands."'23
Under this scenario, Kodak could charge competitive prices in the
equipment market but charge supracompetitive prices for parts and
service. 24 Due to a lack of information about the high lifecycle cost
of owning a Kodak machine, consumers might purchase the Kodak
product. By the time they realized the high price of servicing the
copier, it would be too late to change brands because the consumers
would be "locked in" to the purchase by the "heavy initial outlay"
necessary to purchase a new machine.
The Court's ruling meant that Kodak could be held liable for
antitrust violations due to the existence of market imperfections it did
not create.' The availability of interbrand comparative informa-
tion about lifecycle prices was not within Kodak's control. Although
it could have endeavored to provide lifecycle pricing information for
its own products, it could not provide such information for its
competitors' products. Likewise, the existence of high switching costs
was not under Kodak's control; the high initial purchase cost of
photocopying equipment was a reflection of the sophistication and
expense of manufacturing such equipment, not of Kodak's
anticompetitive behavior in the service market. Furthermore, the
initial sale of equipment took place in a competitive interbrand
market, which tends to hold prices down.
26
By introducing a new multi-factored analysis, the Court in Kodak
moved away from the traditional antitrust analysis, which looked
down-time." Id.
120. See id. at 472.
121. See id. at 476.
122. See id. at 477.
123. Id. at 476.
124. See id. at 478.
125. SeeJacobs, supra note 11, at 344-45 (stating that Court in Kodak rejected market share
proxy in favor of market share analysis that examines market imperfections).
126. See Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 616 & n.3 (9th Cir.
1990) (acknowledging Kodak's lack of market power in interbrand equipment market and
noting that competition in this market might prevent Kodak from possessing power in service
and parts market), affd, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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primarily at the behavior of very large firms in an ostensibly healthy
market. It moved instead toward an antitrust policy that gives equal
consideration to the behavior of relatively small firms operating in a
"pernicious market structure in which the concentration of power saps
the salubrious influence of competition." 27 This new approach
could have far-reaching ramifications for HMOs, which currently
account for only a small share of the health care financing mar-
ket.
128
2. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde
The Supreme Court, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde,129 upheld a Fifth Circuit ruling that certain imperfections in
the health care market could give rise to market power in at least an
"abstract sense""a when a defendant's thirty percent market share
was insufficient to give rise to market power under the traditional
analysis.' The imperfections at issue in Jefferson Parish included a
lack of consumer incentive to compare costs among hospitals' 2 and
a lack of adequate information with which to compare quality among
hospitals. 3 The Court ultimately concluded that, although these
imperfections reduced price competition," their presence alone
was insufficient to support a finding of antitrust violation."3 It
suggested, however, that if these imperfections were accompanied by
restraints on consumers' choices of health care providers, antitrust
liability could attach.'36
127. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979).
128. SeeJacobs, supra note 11, at 344-45 (noting that this "analytical paradigm... can make
small firms.. . 'powerful' in the antitrust sense").
129. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
130. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984).
131. See id at 7 (noting that only 30% of residents of Jefferson Parish go to defendant
hospital and remaining 70% go to 20 other hospitals in relevant geographic area).
132. See id. at 8 (recounting appellate court finding that prevalence of health insurance
eliminates patients' incentive to compare costs); seealso id at 27-28 (evaluating competitive effect
of consumer indifference to price and concluding that such indifference alone will not force
consumers to make purchases they otherwise would not make).
133. See id. at 8 (reviewing appellate court finding that patients are not sufficiently informed
to compare quality); see also id. at 27-28 (stating that "if consumers cannot evaluate the quality
of... services, it follows that they are indifferent" to the choice of such service providers).
Further, when consumers are indifferent to the choice of service providers, the policy of a
defendant cannot be said to have "foreclosed a choice that otherwise would have been made 'on
the merits."' Id. at 28.
134. See id. at 27 (noting that prevalence of insurers as third-party payors for health care has
led to consumer indifference to price).
135. See id. at 27 n.44.
136. See id. at 27 (holding that mere information deficiencies making consumers Indifferent
to price and quality are insufficient to confer market power in absence of any apparent restraints
on consumer ability to choose anesthesiologist). The Court noted that, given the lack of
incentive to compare costs among hospitals and the lack of information with which to compare
HMO ANTITRUST LIABILITY
The plaintiff in Jefferson Parish was an anesthesiologist who applied
for staff privileges at East Jefferson Hospital in Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana." 7 After being approved initially, the anesthesiologist was
denied privileges by the Hospital Board because the hospital had
signed an exclusive contract with another anesthesiologist."s The
plaintiff sued under section 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging that East
Jefferson had implemented an illegal tying arrangement by which
patients needing surgery at the hospital were forced to purchase
anesthesiology services from the exclusive contractor."8 9
The Court first found that, although the exclusive contract was a
tying arrangement,' 4 it could be illegal only if it forced patients to
purchase anesthesiology services they did not need.'41 The plaintiff
alleged that the contract forced consumers to make such unwanted
purchases." He further asserted that the hospital's thirty percent
market share indicated that patients preferred East Jefferson to
others, and that the lack of consumer incentive to compare cost and
quality among hospitals enabled East Jefferson to charge
supracompetitive prices." The Court ultimately concluded that the
tying arrangement'was not illegal because patients were free to go to
twenty other hospitals operating in the region, and empirical evidence
indicated that they frequently did so."4 Thus, although the Court
in Jefferson Parish acknowledged that market imperfections could give
rise to market power, the imperfections present in the case were not
of a magnitude sufficient to render rational economic explanations
incapable of "accurately explain [ing] the behavior of... markets," as
was the case in Kodak."
quality, a consumer would have to be sophisticated to "know the difference between two
anesthesiologists." Id. at 30 & n.49. However, there "was no evidence that any patient [with the
requisite sophistication] was not also able to go to a hospital that would provide him with the
anesthesiologist of his choice." Id at 30.
137. See id. at 5.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 8 (reviewing appellate court analysis under which hospital's operating rooms
were designated "tying product," and hospital's chosen anesthesia service was designated as "tied
product").
140. See id. at 23 (noting that there was sufficient demand for purchase ofanesthesiological
services separate from hospital services and that other hospitals allowed such services to be
purchased separately). The Court found that consumers differentiate between anesthesiological
services, and that such services are not fungible, but differ slightly from provider to provider.
See id.
141. See id. at 25.
142. See id. at 27.
143. See id. at 26-27.
144. See id. at 27 (noting that 70% of patients residing in Jefferson Parish enter hospitals
other than EastJefferson, indicating that hospital's "dominance" is "far from overwhelming").
145. Id. at 26-29.
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The Court in Jefferson Parish also made an important distinction in
its analysis of East Jefferson's behavior. It acknowledged that in the
field of health care, a potential monopolist often can be regarded as
either a seller or buyer of health services.'46 As a seller of health
care services, the relevant inquiry would be into conduct by an alleged
monopolist that results in a reduction in the ability of competing
sellers to enter the market. 47 Such conduct reduces elasticity of
supply." As a buyer, the inquiry would be into conduct that
reduces the number of buyers available for similar services. 149 The
lower courts have employed this dual analysis in cases involving
allegedly anticompetitive behavior by HMOs. 5 ° Kodak and Jefferson
Parish thus identify three imperfections that now could give rise to
liability in the absence of substantial market share:' (1) informa-
tion deficiencies;152 (2) high costs for consumers to switch from one
146. See id. at 8 & n.8 (noting that court of appeals considered impact of East Jefferson's
exclusive contract on patients, but not on anesthesiologists). An important question in
evaluating the competitive impact of EastJefferson's behavior as a purchaser of anesthesiology
services would be the extent to which excluded anesthesiologists could find other buyers for
their services. See id. The Court in Jefferson Parish found scant evidence on this issue, but
ultimately concluded that the presence of numerous hospitals with "open" policies made it likely
that a patient with a preference could "go to a hospital that would provide him with the
anesthesiologist of his choice." Id. at 30.
147. See id. at 7-8 & nn.7-8 (considering impact of EastJefferson's contract on patients' ability
to obtain anesthesiology services of their choice from sources other than East Jefferson).
148. High supply elasticity means that there are low barriers for firms producing similar
goods to increase production in response to an increase in price by a competitor. See Landes
& Posner, supra note 35, at 945-51 (describing supply elasticity as function of ease with which
competitors can enter market).
149. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 8 & n.8 (noting that there are 156 anesthesiologists and
345 hospitals with operating rooms in Louisiana).
150. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wis. United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting that definition of market "depends on substitutability on the supply side
as well as on the demand side"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996). Afirm can be a monopolist
as a purchaser of health services when it forecloses entry into the market by competitors, thereby
eliminating substitutability of supply. See id. at 1412; see also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 598 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that "[o]ne can monopolize a
product as either a seller or a buyer"). A firm can be a monopolist as a buyer of health services
when it controls a substantial portion of the consumers of health services. See id. This could
be true of an HMO if it enrolled a substantial portion of the population in a given geographic
area. See id.; see also Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1329 (7th
Cir. 1986) (recognizing that some "financing and insurance package (s]... [are] both a method
ofjoining physicians in a firm and a method of financing their service by selling memberships
for stated monthly prices").
151. SeeJefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26 (noting that defendant hospital had only 30% market
share); Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 616 n.3, 621 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding Kodak liable for non-competitive activities related to servicing of its copiers,
although Kodak's overall share of plain-paper copier market was less than two percent), afftd,
504 U.S. 451 (1992).
152. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,473 (1992) (noting
that high cost of obtaining information about products is "forceful" reason for finding market
power in absence of high market share).
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product to another;15 and (3) financing arrangements that reduce
price competition, if accompanied by restrictions on consumers'
choice of products. 54 The health care market incorporates each of
these imperfections to some degree. 55 Under Kodak, HMOs may
be deemed to possess market power if they are perceived to benefit
from these imperfections. Further, HMOs may be found to possess
market power under Jefferson Parish if certain market trends continue
to reduce consumer options in the health care financing market.156
B. Potential Divergence of HMO and Health Care Financing Markets
To date, courts have included HMOs in a broad product market
defined to encompass all "health care financing" products, including
traditional indemnity (or "fee-for-service") insurance and PPOs. 57
This definition is based primarily on two factors. First, courts
consider consumer perception that HMOs and other forms of health
care financing are interchangeable.'58 Such interchangeability
reflects the cross-elasticity of demand between HMOs and other forms
of health care financing.'59 Second, courts consider the relative
ease with which providers of one form of health financing can modify
153. See id. at 473 (noting that "existence of significant ... switching costs" is "forceful"
reason for finding market power, even without high market share).
154. SeeJeffierson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27 (noting that prevalence of insurers as third-party payors
for health care reduces incentive to compare hospital costs and lack of adequate information
to compare quality among hospitals allows hospitals to charge non-competitive prices). The
Court held that, at least in an "abstract sense," these factors, if coupled with restraints on
consumer choice of provider, could give rise to antitrust liability even in the absence of
substantial market share. See id
155. See generally infra Part IV (analyzing imperfections in health care financing market).
156. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text (describing how exclusions on coverage
of pre-existing conditions and adverse selection have reduced consumer options in purchase of
health care financing products).
157. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding that HMOs belong to same product market as fee-for-service and PPO
plans), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Heathsource, Inc., 986 F.2d
589,591 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that HMOs belong to same product market as indemnity, PPO,
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Medicare and Medicaid plans).
158. See, e.g., Marshfiekl 65 F.3d at 1410 ("The record shows, what is anyway well known, that
individuals, and their employers, and medical insurers... regard HMOs as competitive not only
with each other but also with the various types of fee-for-service providers."); U.S. Healthcare, 986
F.2d at 591 (upholding lower court ruling that HMOs exist in broadly defined health care
financing market because they are viewed as interchangeable with fee-for-service arrangements,
Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans, Medicare, and Medicaid); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp.
Ins. Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1332 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that consumers will switch readily from
one form of health care financing to another in response to price increase).
159. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956) (calling
for assessment of cross-elasticity of demand in determining relevant product market for
cellophane); Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 945 (describing elasticity of demand as function
of consumer perception that goods are interchangeable). High elasticity of demand means that
if an HMO raises its price, it will lose a large number of customers; low elasticity means that if
an HMO raises its prices, it will lose few customers. See id.
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production to offer another in response to an increase in prices by a
producer of similar goods. 1" This test for "ease of entry" into the
market reflects elasticity of supply. 6' Applying these principles,
courts have found that consumers view HMOs as interchangeable with
other forms of health care financing, and that there are low entry
barriers for new competitors.162 Having thus defined the market
broadly, courts apply the market share proxy to test for market power.
As a component of the "health care financing market," HMOs
typically do not hold a sufficient market share to be deemed to
possess market power under the traditional analysis."6
The potential impact of Kodak and Jefferson Parish on market
definition in HMO cases is that courts, in defining relevant product
markets, may no longer place primary emphasis on market share and
product interchangeability." They may look instead at the ability
of HMOs to exert control over their segment of the health care
financing market as a result of market imperfections. While courts
traditionally have looked at a firm's ability to exert control over a
segment of the market as a secondary component of market defini-
tion, they have done so only after finding high market share." A
160. See Ball Mem'I Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1330-32, 1335 (finding that defendant lacked market
power in medical insurance where market share was 27% of patients in Indiana, new firms could
enter market easily, existing firms could expand sales quickly, and there were no barriers to
entry); see also Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1410-11 ("[T]he definition of a market depends on
substitutability on the supply side as well as on the demand side.").
Both consumers and insurers view health financing products as interchangeable. See id. Thus,
if the only HMO in a geographic market raises prices above the competitive level, the market
will respond in two ways: (1) consumers will switch to other forms of health care financing that
are competitively priced; and (2) producers will take advantage of the opportunity to gain
customers by offering HMOs at a competitive price. See id.
161. High supply elasticity means that there are low barriers for firms producing similar
goods to increase production in response to an increase in price by a competitor. See Landes
& Posner, supra note 35, at 945-51 (describing supply elasticity as function of ease with which
competitors can enter market).
162. See generally Marshfiel. 65 F.3d at 1410 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "individuals, and
their employers, and medical insurers ... regard HMOs as competitive not only with each other
but also with the various types of" other health care financing products), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1288 (1996); U.S. Healthar4 986 F.2d at, 591 (noting that "familiar alternatives to HMOs"
include fee-for-service arrangements, Blue Gross/Blue Shield plans, Medicare, and Medicaid);
Ball MemlIHosp., 784 F.2d at 1332 (quoting lower court ruling that "'[c]onsumers are extremely
price sensitive and will readily switch on the basis of price from one company or form of [health
care] financing to another'").
163. See Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1413 (holding that even if HMO had 100% of HMO
subscribers, its share of health care financing market was inadequate to support finding of
market power); U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 597 (holding that sole supplier of HMO services had
inadequate market share in health care financing market to support monopolization charge).
164. Cf. U.S. Healthcare 986 F.2d at 598 (lamenting that "[t] here is no subject in antitrust law
more confusing than market definition").
165. Compare Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 956 (10th Cir.)
(holding that defendant insurer possessed market power when all hospitals and approximately
90% of physicians in market were under contract with it), with Ball Mem'1 Hosp., 784 F.2d at
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court, finding that market imperfections enable an HMO to exert
control over its segment of the health care financing market, could
conclude under Kodak that HMOs comprise a separate product
market.
Changing conditions in the health care financing market, more-
over, could lead courts to perceive a separation of the markets for
HMOs and other forms of coverage even under traditional methods
of market definition. Rapidly increasing HMO enrollment, coupled
with adverse selection and coverage exclusions for pre-existing
conditions, could render HMOs and other forms of health care
financing non-interchangeable. 1" Disparities in reimbursement,
patient volume, and patient type may cause physicians to align with
either HMOs or fee-for-service plans. 6  These factors, coupled with
the use of exclusivity contracts and the trend toward physician
ownership of HMOs, may reduce the supply of physicians available to
join newly forming or expanding HMOs.1"a If both demand and
supply for HMOs become sufficiently inelastic, courts could begin to
view the HMO market as separate from the health care financing
market. Each individual HMO would hold substantially higher market
share in a product market consisting of only HMOs. In such a
divided market, courts could find that HMOs have market power even
under the traditional market share proxy.
169
1334, 1335, 1346 (holding that defendant insurer did not have market power when it insured
27% of patients in market). Prior to its decision in Kodak, the Supreme Court held that a
hospital did not possess market power when it served 30% of the patients in its market area, and
the remaining 70% of patients went elsewhere. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 26-27 (1984); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956) (using term "monopoly power" synonymously with market power). Justice Reed,
delivering the opinion of the Court in du Pon observed:
If cellophane is the "market" that du Pont is found to dominate, it may be assumed it
does have monopoly power over that "market." Monopoly power is the power to
control prices or exclude competition.... [For it] is inconceivable that price could
be controlled without power over competition or vice versa.
Id. at 391-92 (foomote omitted).
166. See infra notes 252-92 and accompanying text (describing how increasing HMO
enrollment, information deficiencies, adverse selection, and pre-existing condition exclusions
could make poor substitutes of HMOs and other forms of health care financing).
167. See Marshfited 65 F.3d at 1410 (listing factors physicians may consider in determining
whether to associate with HMOs or other health insurance providers).
168. See infra notes 293-97 and accompanying text (discussing how physician preferences,
ownership of HMOs, and exclusivity contracts could deplete supply of available physician-
panelists for newly forming HMOs).
169. SeeTHE INTERSTUDYComPETITIVE EDGE, 5.2 REGIONAL MARKETANALYSIS 23 (Nov. 1995)
[hereinafter 1995 INTERSTUDY REGIONAL MARKET ANALYsis] (reporting that most markets have
at least one HMO with dominant market share of HMO enrollees). Nearly two-thirds of large
markets, three-quarters of medium markets, and four-fifths of small markets have one dominant
HMO. See id. A dominant HMO is defined as one that commands at least 33% of enrollment
in the market See id. at 20. Large markets are those with one million or more residents,
medium markets have between 250,000 and one million residents, and small markets have less
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III. LOWER COuRT ASSESSMENT OF HMO ANnTRUST LIABILUTY
The First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have ruled on antitrust
claims against an HMO or large insurer. In defining the HMO
market, the First and Seventh Circuits have relied on traditional
concepts of product interchangeability to find that HMOs are a
component of the health care financing market. 70 In assessing
market power, the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have employed
the traditional method of measuring elasticity of supply and demand
to arrive at differing conclusions about the market power of insurer-
defendants. 171
None of the circuits, however, has taken into account the possibility
raised in Kodak and Jefferson Parish that market imperfections could
divide the health care financing and HMO markets or confer market
power on a defendant who appears to lack such power under
traditional analysis. 172  Both the First and Seventh Circuits acknowl-
edged at least the possibility that HMOs could comprise a discrete
product market in some circumstances. 73 Although the Supreme
Court recently denied certiorari to the Seventh Circuit in Blue Cross
than 250,000 residents. See id. at 8.
170. See Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1411 (finding HMO not liable for monopolization and defining
HMO product market to include all forms of health care financing); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 597-99 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding HMO not liable for
monopolization because of lack of market power within relevant product market).
171. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 965-66, 969 (10th
Cir.) (finding that defendant possessed market power in medical insurance where barrier to
entry by competitors was evidenced by 62% market share of patients in Kansas); Ocean State
Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1109-11 (1st Cir.
1989) (holding that insurer policy of paying no more for physician services than payment by
competing HMO did not violate Sherman Act § 2, despite existence of market power, because
insurer did not engage in "predatory" pricing); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc.,
784 F.2d 1325, 1330, 1334, 1335, 1346 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that defendant lacked market
power in medical insurance although market share was 27% of patients in Indiana).
172. See supra notes 95-156 and accompanying text (describing how, under analysis of Kodak
and Jefferson Parish, market imperfections can give rise to market power even without high
market share); see also supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text (describing how health care
market imperfections may cause HMO market to diverge from health care financing market
under Kodak and Jefferson Parish analysis).
173. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 986 F.2d at 598 (acknowledging that U.S. Healthcare has at least
some basis for asserting that HMOs constitute separate market from other health care service
providers); see also Mary Chris Jaklevic, Court Amends Its Opinion in Marshfield Clinic Ruling,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 23, 1995, at 24 (reporting that 7th Circuit amended its original
ruling in Marshfield to allow for possibility that HMOs could constitute discrete product market).
The Seventh Circuit acceded to objections from the DOJ and FTC disputing the court's
unqualified statements that HMOs cannot constitute a product market separate from other
forms of health care financing. See id. The court qualified its position, acknowledging that the
terms HMO and PPO "refer to a variety of different types of [plans], which may vary in respects
crucial to antitrust liability." Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1411. The court further emphasized that its
ruling applied only to the factual record compiled by the district court. See id.
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and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic,174 the questions
of how to properly define the HMO market and how to assess market
power are likely to be the subject of considerable antitrust litigation
in the future. 75 As HMOs continue to consolidate, 76 courts may
find the principles of Kodak and Jefferson Parish more appealing in
defining the HMO market and evaluating power within that market.
A. Lower Court Definition of the HMO Market
1. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield
Clinic
In Marshfield, the Seventh Circuit held that a doctor-owned clinic
and its subsidiary HMO, Security, which enrolled nearly ninety
percent of all HMO subscribers in the region, did not foreclose the
market to new competitors in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 177  The court's holding was based, in large part, on its broad
definition of the HMO market to include all forms of health care
financing.17 As a component of this broadly-defined market,
Security held less than fifty percent market share, an amount too
174. 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); see also Blue Cross
Granted Time to Go to Supreme Court MILNWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 1995, at Bus. 2 (reporting
that 7th Circuit granted Blue Cross's request to postpone order for new trial on damages while
Blue Cross petitioned Supreme Court for certiorari).
175. See David Burda, Lax Enforcement Paints Favorable Legal Outlook, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Jan. 1, 1996, at 49-50 (advising health care industry to "[e]xpect more Marshfield-like antitrust
litigation" involving HMOs). Litigation is likely to be brought by private parties, such as insurers
who are "locked out of markets by dominant provider groups" or by provider groups that are
closed out of other markets bi dominant insurers. Id State enforcers also may elect to bring
antitrust actions similar to those in Marshfield. See Marshfield Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note
93, at 2; see also Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 95-1698, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6480, at *18-'19 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1996) (rejecting defendant HMO's motion for
judgment as matter of law and holding, under Kodak, that relevant product market was all
members of single dominant HMO).
Urging the Court to grant certiorari to the 7th Circuit, attorneys general representing 26
states asserted that they were "keenly disappointed" that the 7th Circuit departed from Supreme
Court antitrust precedent. See id. at 3. They argued further that as "the primary public
enforcers of the state antitrust laws, which are often required to be interpreted in conformity
with federal law," they have a "vital interest" in maintaining antitrust law as applied to health
care markets. Id. at 2-3.
176. See, e.g., William W. Price III, Will Giant HMOs Help Health Care? An Executive at Fountain
Valle)-Based FHP Says That There is Still Plenty of Room for Competition, and that Consumers Could
Benefit, LA TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at D1 (describing HMO merger resulting in 4.4 million-
member HMO); Winslow & Scism, supra note 89, atA2 (describing HMO acquisition resulting
in managed health care company serving 23 million people).
177. See Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1409, 1412 (finding that Security was not monopolist of HMO
services). Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, monopolization of trade between states is a
felony. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
178. See Marshfiel4 65 F.3d at 1411 (ruling that no reasonable jury could have found that
HMO constituted separate product market).
120 THE AMERICAN UIVERSnIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:91
small to raise an inference of market power. 79 The court's defini-
tion of the market relied primarily on two conclusions:18 ° (1)
consumers of health care financing view HMOs as interchangeable
with PPO plans and traditional indemnity insurance;' 8 ' and (2)
barriers to entry by new HMOs are low.8 2 There are several
weaknesses in the court's reasoning in Marshfield that make its
conclusions susceptible to a contrary interpretation under the Kodak
and Jefferson Parish analysis.
First, although the Marshfield Clinic employed all of the physicians
in Marshfield and several other towns,1" the court in Marshfield
reasoned that these physicians nevertheless would be willing to serve
other HMOs because they were not under exclusive contract to
Security and many of them already participated in PPOs.l& The
mere absence of an exclusive contract, however, does not mean that
a physician is willing to provide services to an HMO entering the
market in response to a price increase by an existing HMO. Many of
Security's physician members held an ownership interest in the
HMO.'" These physicians had an economic incentive not to join
competing HMOs because the success of other HMOs might threaten
179. See id. (holding that plaintiff was unable to show that defendant had market share of
50% in product market and that 50% is below "accepted benchmark" for inferring monopoly
power from market share). The court noted that Security "did have a monopoly share of the
HMO 'market,' but we have held that that is not a proper market." Id. at 1413. Further, the
court held that because the plaintiff did not prove monopoly power, it was unnecessary to
consider the methods by which Security acquired or maintained it. See id.
180. See id. at 1410 (analyzing "substitutability on the supply side as well as on the demand
side" in determining whether HMOs are definable as separate product market).
181. See id. ("The record shows, what is anyway well known, that individuals, and their
employers, and medical insurers... regard HMOs as competitive not only with each other but
also with the various types of fee-for-service provider.").
182. See id. at 1410, 1413 (stating that contracts between Security and its physician members
did not forbid physicians from joining other HMOs). The court also noted its skepticism that
Security's prohibition on "cross coverage" agreements between its physician members and non-
members discouraged hospitals from joining HMOs that compete with Security. See id. at 1413.
Such agreements enable one physician to care for another physician's patients while that
physician is out of town. See id.
183. See id. at 1409 (noting that record did not disclose what percentage of total physician
population 400 physicians employed by clinic comprised). The lower court record, however,
disclosed that the Marshfield Clinic employed all of the physicians in the town of Marshfield,
as well as several other towns. See id.
184. See id. at 1410 ("All that is needed [to create an HMO] is an army of physicians who
among them provide a broad range of medical services, and the same thing is needed for a
preferred-provider plan."). The court in Marshfield also noted that physicians participating in
the Marshfield HMO were not under exclusive contract and could sell their services to other
HMOs. See id. at 1409-10. The court concluded, therefore, that barriers to entry by new HMOs
were low. See id. at 1410.
185. See id. at 1408 (noting that Marshfield Clinic was owned by its 400 physician-employees
and that clinic owned Security HMO).
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that of Security." 6 Thus, elasticity of supply might have been low
despite the absence of exclusive contracts because physicians
voluntarily refused to contract with newly forming HMOs out of
economic self-interest.
Second, the mere perception of product interchangeability does not
enable consumers to seek altemative coverage in response to a price
increase by an HMO. Market imperfections, such as the practice by
insurers of excluding coverage of pre-existing conditions, can prevent
consumers from seeking alternative coverage despite the perception
that products are similar."8 ' Such practices can raise consumer
"switching costs" by forcing consumers with pre-existing conditions to
either accept prices above the competitive level or forego coverage
altogether." High switching costs thus decrease elasticity of
demand by reducing or eliminating consumer ability to seek
alternative coverage in response to a price increase.
Finally, the court held that monopoly power could not be inferred
from Security's high prices or high rate of return relative to its
competitors because the service it offered was "heterogeneous. "189
Product heterogeneity, however, can be a poor explanation for price
differences between a monopoly product and "substitutes" offered by
other firms."° Courts have held that in a monopoly situation, a
186. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 592 (1st Cir. 1993)
(describing HMO strategy of encouraging doctors to become shareholders in order to give them
incentive to contain costs). But see Marshfidd, 65 F.3d at 1411 (determining that physician
members of Security derived insubstantial sums from their association with Security and
Marshfield Clinic, and were not contractually restrained from competing with either entity).
187. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text (describing how insurance coverage
exclusions for pre-existing conditions have caused widespread consumer "lock-in" and 'job-
lock").
188. See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text (describing severe limitation of coverage
options placed on consumers with pre-existing conditions).
189. See MarshiJeld, 65 F.3d at 1411-12 (concluding that clinic's high prices and rate of return
could reflect factors other than market power, such as variations in quality or in product itself).
The clinic's ability to charge monopoly prices implies that Security also had such an ability. The
court proclaimed, however, that "there is not even a good economic theory that associates
monopoly power with a high rate of return." Id.
This conclusion is contradicted by at least one study of HMO operating margins in small
markets. See 1995 INTERSTUDY REGIONAL MARKET ANALYSIS, supra note 169, at 35 (Nov. 1995)
(examining effects of HMO competition on operating margins). The study found that HMOs
serving small markets-those with a population of less than 250,000-have the lowest operating
margins when there are at least two significant market shares. See id. at 8, 35. Security served
a small market, but it held the only significant market share in that market. See Marshfie, 65
F.3d at 1409 (noting that "Marshfield is a town of only 20,000 people in a largely rural region").
According to the study, if a competitor were to enter the Marshfield market, Security's rate of
return likely would drop. It therefore is reasonable to assume that Security's high rate of return
is a result of the absence of competition in the market, and not merely of product heterogene-
ity.
190. See Gellhorn & Kovacic, supra note 53, at 102-03 (describing analytical weakness known
as "cellophane fallacy," in which price differences merely indicate that imperfect competition
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firm with market power can make its product appear interchangeable
with substitutes that are functionally inferior, but more expensive,
simply by raising prices to the level of the more expensive prod-
uct.
19 1
The court's reasoning in Marshfield involved the same kind of
economic formalism the Supreme Court rejected in Koda' 92 and
eschewed in Jefferson Parsh.'93 The court held that the mere pres-
ence of some factors which make supply and demand elastic in theory,
such as the apparent availability of physicians and consumer percep-
tion of product interchangeability, precluded the possibility that
market imperfections rendered supply and demand inelastic in
fact.'94 This weakness in the court's reasoning raises the possibility
that courts applying the principles of Kodak and Jefferson Parish could
conclude, under facts similar to those in Marshfield, that HMOs
constitute a discrete product market.
2. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc.
In U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc.,195 the First Circuit was
faced with a suit alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act brought by an HMO wishing to enter a market against
a dominant HMO already operating in that market.9 ' The defen-
has forced consumers to regard poor substitutes as interchangeable products). Commentators
first detected this fallacy in United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956),
the Supreme Court's seminal market definition case. The Court failed to consider whether high
elasticity of demand among manufacturers of flexible wrapping materials meant only that du
Pont, the exclusive manufacturer of cellophane, had already raised prices to monopolistic levels.
See Gellhom & Kovacic, supra note 53, at 102-03. The "cellophane fallacy" states that elasticity
of demand is an accurate test of whether two products are good substitutes only if competitive
prices are being charged for each. See id. The court in Marshfield assumed that HMOs and
other forms of health care financing were good substitutes first, then concluded that any price
difference was the result of differences in product or quality. See Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 410-12;
see also United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 105 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing
government's contention that consumers' unwillingness to switch away from Kodak film
following price increase indicates that Kodak was already pricing film at monopolistic levels).
191. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding that issue in defining HMO product market is "whether a sole supplier of HMO
services ... could raise price far enough over cost, and for a long enough period, to enjoy
monopoly profits").
192. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466 (1992)
(holding that legal presumptions based on "formalistic distinctions" instead of"market realities"
generally are disfavored in antitrust law). Rather than considering only market share, therefore,
the Court will consider the "responsiveness of sales of one product to the price changes of the
other." Id. at 467 (quoting du Pont, 351 U.S. at 400).
193. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (holding that
Court will examine economic realities of market at issue).
194. See Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1411-12 (indicating that factors must be viewed in context of
circumstances surrounding market in question).
195. 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
196. See U.S. Healthcare Inc., 986 F.2d at 591-93.
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dant, Healthsource, was the only non-staff-model HMO operating in
New Hampshire and had enrolled approximately five percent of the
population of the state. 97 Many contracted physicians were stock-
holders in the company,' and eighty-seven percent of them signed
exclusive contracts under which they agreed not to serve any other
HMO."9  The plaintiff, U.S. Healthcare, was one of the nation's
largest HMOs, with more than one million enrollees but no opera-
tions in New Hampshire.
20
The court, reviewing U.S. Healthcare's claims under the "rule of
reason,"2 °' concentrated on the question of market definition.2
197. See id. at 591 (noting that Healthsource was structured as "IPA" model HMO,
contracting directly with independent physicians).
198. See id. at 592 (indicating that at least 400 physicians had become stockholders).
199. See i& (recounting origin and motivation behind exclusivity clause). Healthsource was
planning a public offering of its stock and was aware that HMOs from nearby states were
interested in moving into New Hampshire. See id. The main concern was that after Health-
source went public, many of the doctor-owners would sell their stock in Healthsource and join
multiple HMOs to increase their patient volume. See id. In response to this perceived threat,
Healthsource offered a new contract option to its physicians, whereby they could receive a 14%
increase in reimbursement if they agreed not to serve any other HMO. See id. Physicians were
free under the agreement to serve patients in various non-IMO health care financing arrange-
ments. See id. Ultimately, nearly 87% of Healthsource's physicians opted for exclusivity. See id.
at 592.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 595 (concluding that application of "rule of reason" test was proper). The
court considered reviewing the claim under the per se, quick look and rule of reason tests, but
found the per se and quick look tests to be inappropriate. See id. at 593-95. It held that the per
se test was not applicable to facts such as those presented in this case, but only to cases involving
a "secondary boycott," that is, cases in which competitors agree not to do business with suppliers
that deal with competitors they wish to harm. See id. at 593 (noting that "per se condemnation
is not visited on every arrangement that might, as a matter of language, be called a group
boycott"). The court speculated further, saying- "We doubt that the modem Supreme Court
would use the boycott label to describe, or the rubric to condemn, a joint venture among
competitors in which participation was allowed to some but not all." Id. The court thus
compared the exclusivity contract to a vertical exclusivity arrangement among sellers at different
levels of production, which is not strictly prohibited under antitrust law. See id. It stressed that
horizontal arrangements among producers competing at the same level of production are
prohibited. See id.
The court also concluded that the cases relied upon by the plaintiff were inapposite to give
rise to use of the quick look test. See id. The court explained that the exclusivity clause was not
.so patently bad that even a brief glance at its impact, lack of business benefit and
anticompetitive intent [would) suffice to condemn it." Id.
In applying the rule of reason, the court observed that "[e]xclusive dealing arrangements...
come in a variety of forms and serve a range of objectives." Id. at 595. These arrangements can
serve "benign" purposes, such as fostering dealer loyalty or ensuring adequate supply. See i&i
They also can have anticompetitive consequences, however, such as foreclosure of"so much of
the available supply or outlet capacity that existing competitors or new entrants may be limited
or excluded." Id. The propriety of an exclusive dealing arrangement thus depends on the
particular circumstances of its use. The court found, therefore, that the rule of reason, which
balances the procompetitive and anti-competitive effects of a defendant's conduct, was the most
appropriate test under which to review U.S. Healthcare's claims. See id.; see also supra note 81
(describing rule of reason test).
202. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 986 F.2d at 597-98 (noting that trial judge dismissed plaintiffs
claims based on his assessment that defendant lacked power within broadly defined "health care
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It began by asking whether Healthsource should be viewed as a
potential monopolist in the sale of health care services to consumers
or in the purchase of health care services from physicians.203  The
court concluded that Healthsource was most appropriately viewed as
a seller of services because the potential anticompetitive effect of the
exclusivity clause was to foreclose the market to HMOs by eliminating
the supply of doctors whose services competing HMOs could sell to
consumers.2 4  Next, the court inquired as to the nature of the
product market in which Healthsource operated and, deferring to the
trial court ruling, concluded that the market was health care
financing.205 Employing the traditional market share proxy, the
court held that Healthsource possessed too small a market share to
have market power.0 6 It found, therefore, that Healthsource was
not liable under either section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.
2°
The trial court based its broad definition of the HMO market on
reasoning similar to that later used by the Seventh Circuit in
Marshfield, namely, that HMOs are interchangeable with other forms
of health care financing.2 8  While the First Circuit affirmed this
interpretation, it acknowledged the possibility that the HMO market
financing" market and that, if this market definition were incorrect, remand might be required).
203. See id. at 598 (noting that one can monopolize market as either buyer or seller).
204. See id. (affirming correcmess of trial judge's analysis of defendant as seller of health
services). Courts, in defining markets, must ask themselves why they are doing so. See id. In
this case, U.S. Healthcare asserted that Healthsource had foreclosed the market to other HMOs
by "buying" up the supply of doctors whose services could be sold to consumers. See id. The
court rejected this approach, stating that in order to monopolize the market as a buyer of health
services, Healthsource would have to close off the market such that doctors could not find other
buyers for their services. See id. Because other buyers of physician services, such as fee-for-
service plans like Medicare and Medicaid, were not affected by the exclusivity clause,
Healthsource could not have used it to foreclose the market as a buyer of health services. See
id. The appropriate perspective through which to evaluate the impact of Healthsource's
exclusivity clause, therefore, was that of a seller of health care services. See id.
205. See id. at 597-98 (noting that magistrate judge defined relevant product market broadly
to include "all health care financing in New Hampshire").
206. See id. at 598 (noting that if foreclosure effect of exclusivity clause was greater, it might
be possible to describe Healthsource as monopolist or potential monopolist). Evidence
presented at trial indicated that Healthsource enrolled only about 5% of the residents of New
Hampshire. See id. at 591. The magistrate judge believed this was too small a share of the
health care financing market to support a monopolization or attempted monopolization charge
under Sherman Act § 2. See id. at 597. The court held that "[i]f health care financing is the
product, as the magistratejudge determined, plainly Healthsource has no monopoly or anything
close to it." Id. at 599. The court observed, however, that "the only way to cast Healthsource
as a monopolist is to argue ... that HMO services are a separate health care product." Id. at
598.
207. See id. at 599.
208. See i&L (noting market definition is "sometimes described as [issue) of interchangeability
of products and services"). The court cited the extensive discussion of "cross elasticity of
demand" in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-404 (1956) in
support of this observation. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 986 F. 2d at 599.
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could be separated from that of other forms of health care financ-
ing.2" First, the court observed that the HMO market could
diverge from the health care financing market if HMOs could raise
and sustain prices above the competitive level long enough to enjoy
monopoly profits. ° The ability to charge supracompetitive prices
without losing customers to other forms of health care financing
would indicate inelastic demand.1
Second, the court held that market separation could occur if a
sufficient number of physicians signed exclusive contracts requiring
lengthy advance notice before termination.1 Such contracts could
render supply inelastic by eliminating so much of the available supply
of physicians that the ability of competitors to enlist panel doctors to
serve new HMOs would be severely limited or foreclosed.1 Finally,
209. See U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 599 (accepting magistrate judge's definition of market
as "health care financing market" but implying that U.S. Healthcare might have offered expert
testimony to demonstrate that HMOs constitute their own market). The court called U.S.
Healthcare's argument that HMOs are distinct from the health care financing market a
"legitimate contention." Id. at 598. The issue for an expert witness would be "whether a sole
supplier of HMO services ... could raise price far enough over cost, and for a long enough
period, to enjoy monopoly profits." Id. at 599.
Evidence collected in recent years by independent research groups studying HMO market
behavior suggests that a sole supplier of HMO services can raise prices higher above costs than
an HMO in a competitive market. See 1995 INTERSTUDY REGIONAL MARKErANALYSIS, supra note
169, at 31 (reporting that in small and large markets dominated by a single HMO, operating
margins were higher than in markets supporting rival HMOs). These "dominant" HMOs,
however, have not raised prices so far above cost that they could be considered to enjoy
monopoly profits. See id. For example, operating margins of dominant HMOs typically
exceeded the median operating margin by a very small amount. See id. at 30-31 (reporting that
average HMO operating margin in large cities is 3.28%, while operating margin in large cities
with one dominant HMO is 3.7%).
210. See U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 599 (noting that market definition typically is ascertained
through expert testimony of economists). The court indicated that "here, the issue for an
economist would be whether a sole supplier of HMO services... could raise price far enough
over cost, and for a long enough period, to enjoy monopoly profits." Id. The court's statement
starkly contradicts that of the court in Marshfield, which proclaimed that "there is not even a
good economic theory that associates monopoly power with a high rate of return." Blue Cross
& Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denie;
116 S. Ct. 128 (1996).
211. SeeEastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,469 (1992) ("The
extent to which one market prevents exploitation of another market depends on the extent to
which consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a price change
in another, that is, the 'cross-elasticity of demand.'").
212. See U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 593-98 (acknowledging that it might be possible to
describe Healthsource as monopolist, using exclusionary clause to foster or reinforce its power).
The court noted that the primary danger of the exclusivity clause was that it could "'foreclose'
so much of the available supply... that existing competitors or new entrants may be limited
or excluded." Id. at 595.
213. See id. (holding that exclusivity clause had not rendered physician pool empty). The
court observed that the number of primary care physicians tied to Heathsource through
exclusive contracts-25%-eft an adequate number of other physicians "available" to contract
with competing HMOs. See id at 596. It held further that the 30-day termination notice
required by the exclusivity clause was close to a de minimus restraint. See id. A 180-day
termination notice, however, could frustrate the efforts of new HMOs to enlist panel doctors.
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the court acknowledged it was a "legitimate contention" that HMO
services and pricing differ enough from other forms of health care
financing to support the conclusion that HMOs comprise a separate
product market.214 Thus, while the court used the traditional
method of market definition to find that HMOs are a component of
the health care financing market, it acknowledged the possibility that
HMOs could comprise a discrete product market under an alternative
analysis.
B. Market Power Determinations in Cases Involving HMO or Insurer
The circuits have seen a number of cases during the past decade
brought by HMOs or providers against large insurers.215 These suits
involve allegations that a large insurer is attempting to monopolize
the market for health care financing in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. The following cases illustrate how the circuits have
applied different analyses to determine whether defendants possessed
market power and, if so, whether they illegally exercised that market
power.
The Tenth Circuit found market share to be more important than
ease of entry as a determinant of market power. In Reazin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc.,216 the court upheld a jury verdict
finding violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by a large
insurer.217  The defendant insurer had terminated the contract of a
hospital that recently had been acquired by a competitor and reduced
reimbursement for other hospitals doing business with its competi-
tors.21 All hospitals and approximately ninety percent of the
physicians in the relevant geographic area were under contract with
See id. Finally, the court acknowledged that Healthsource encouraged doctors to become
shareholders to give them "a further stake in Healthsource's success and incentive to contain
costs." Id. at 592; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 950-51 (stating that supply elasticity
is measured by ability of new competitors to enter market in response to price increase by
potential monopolist). In a market characterized by high elasticity of supply, existing firms, such
as fee-for-service insurers, will shift production to offer products similar to those of another firm,
such as an HMO, that raises its prices above the competitive level. See id. Similarly, new
entrants, such as U.S. Healthcare, will be attracted to markets in which a competitor, such as
Healthsource, raises prices above the competitive level.
214. See U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 598 (noting that HMOs are often cheaper than other
forms of health care financing, emphasize illness and prevention, and utilize cost controls).
215. See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990);
Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101 (1st
Cir. 1989); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
216. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990).
217. See id. at 972. For the text of sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act, see supra notes 49
and 50.
218. See Reazin, 899 F.2d at 954.
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the defendant at the time; 219 approximately sixty :percent of those
insured in the state were insured by the defendant.220  Examining
the insurer as a buyer of health care services, the court held that
despite the existence of more than 200 insurers in the state, the
defendant possessed market power.22' It concluded that "no other
entrant remotely approached [the defendant's] domination of the
market" and this was evidence that barriers existed to the entry of new
competitors.222
A similar situation yielded markedly different results in the Seventh
Circuit. In Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance,
Inc.,21 the plaintiffs were eighty acute-care hospitals in Indiana
seeking to block implementation of a PPO by Blue Cross, an insurer
with .twenty-seven percent of the patients in the market.224 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant insurer's attempt to limit hospital
reimbursement under its PPO plan violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.21 In determining whether the defendant possessed
market power, the court placed greatest emphasis on the absence of
barriers to entry (or high elasticity of supply) that was evidenced by
the presence of nearly 500 health care insurers in Indiana.226  It
found that market share was not a relevant determinant of market
power when better measures were available. 227 The court held that
"ease of entry and the absence of barriers" was a better measure of
219. See id. at 956.
220. See id. at 969 (noting that estimates of Blue Cross market share ranged from 47% to
62%).
221. See id. at 971.
222. Id. at 971-72 (noting that, although only capital and licensing were necessary to initially
enter market, defendant's enormous size in relation to other insurers "cuts against the argument
that entry barriers were insubstantial"). Other factors, such as Blue Cross' unique ability to
contract directly with hospitals and the widespread perception that it operated with the
endorsement of the legislature, gave added support to the court's finding of market power. See
id.
223. 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
224. See Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1330-31 (7th Cir.
1986).
225. See id. at 1331 (pointing out that plan called for 75% reimbursement to hospitals that
are not part of PPO, and 100% to hospitals that are within PPO).
226. See id at 1335 (examining whether defendant had market power and finding that,
because other firms could provide same services at same price as defendant, there were no
barriers to entry). The court found further, that in the medical insurance market, factors
suggesting that market share does not imply market power exist. See id. These factors include:
(1) new firms could easily enter the market; (2) existing firms could easily expand their sales;
and (3) insurers needed only a license and capital to operate, and there were examples of firms
that had both. See id Finally, the court noted that nearly 1000 firms were licensed to sell health
insurance in Indiana, with nearly 500 currently selling policies. See id. at 1332.
227. See id at 1336 (stating that "when there are better ways to estimate market power [than
market share], the court should use them").
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market power and that under these criteria, the defendant insurer did
not possess market power.2
Finally, the First Circuit ruled that a large insurer did not violate
section 2 of the Sherman Act by adopting cost containment measures
in an attempt to curb the loss of patients to an HMO. In Ocean State
Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island,
Inc.,229 the plaintiff was a private, upstart HMO that offered more
coverage at lower premiums than the defendant, Blue Cross. 2 ° One
way it was able to do this was by negotiating to pay physicians
approximately twenty percent less than they received from Blue
Cross.31 In response, Blue Cross implemented a "prudent buyer"
program under which it paid physicians no more than they accepted
from other payors.232 As a result, more than one quarter of Ocean
State's physicians resigned, apparently to avoid a reduction in Blue
Cross reimbursement. 233 The court held that, although Blue Cross
had market power,2 4 the "prudent buyer" program was not an
illegal exercise of that power because it was instituted to promote
competition and was not exclusionary or predatory.235  The court
thus held that a monopoly is not prohibited, under the rule of
reason, from engaging in honest competition, even if that competi-
tion has the effect of harming its competitors.3 6
IV. ECONOMIC FACTORS RAISING ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR HMOs
To date, courts have defined the HMO product market to include
all forms of health care financing.237 HMOs typically possess low
228. See id. at 1336-37 ("[Mjarket share is just a way of estimating market power."). The
court opined, further, that "ease of entry and the absence of barriers" is a more accurate
determinant of market power. Id. at 1336.
229. 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989).
230. See Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., Inc.,
883 F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding policy of paying physicians no more than they
received from other health payors did not violate § 2 of Sherman Act).
231. See id. at 1103-04 (describing structure of Ocean State and fact that it paid physicians
approximately 20% less for services than did Blue Cross).
232. See id.
233. See id. at 1104.
234. See id. at 1110 (noting that Blue Cross did not dispute its monopoly power in market
for health insurance).
235. See id. (stating that § 2 does not prohibit vigorous competition by monopolies, provided
that competition is not exclusionary); see also Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 749 F.2d 922, 927
(1st Cir. 1984) (holding that unilateral decision by insurer to ban "balance billing'-practice of
billing patients difference between insurance company payments and actual charges-did not
violate Sherman Act because it was not "predatory" or below incremental cost).
236. See Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1110.
237. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406,
1411 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996) (finding that HMOs do not constitute
separate market from other health care financing products); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
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market share as a component of this broadly defined market."
Under traditional antitrust analysis, therefore, courts have been
reluctant to find that HMOs possess market power."9 However,
emerging economic factors, or "market imperfections," in the health
care financing market,2" coupled with the more modem Supreme
Court precedent of Kodak and Jefferson Parish, could lead courts to find
that HMOs possess market power despite their small share of the
market.
241
These economic factors could also prompt courts to conclude that
HMOs comprise a market separate from that of other forms of health
care financing.242  In a market thus divided, each individual HMO
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that "health care financing is the
product market"); Ball Mem'l Hasp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 1325,1329 (7th Cir.
1986) (stating that HMO "is both a method ofjoining physicians in a firm and financing their
services by selling memberships for stated monthly prices").
238. See 1995 INTERSTtuDY REGIONAL MARKET ANALYSIS, supra note 169, at 9 (stating that
average combined market penetration for "pure" HMOs in all U.S. markets is 21.9%); see also
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra note 9, at 23 (noting that in 1988, 73% of
individuals insured by private health insurance had traditional indemnity coverage, with 27%
covered by HMOs and other forms of managed care). By 1993, HMOs and other forms of
managed care accounted for 66% of the private health insurance market, and indemnity
insurance accounted for only 33% of the market. See id. Hybrid plans, such as "point of service"
plans, which combine gatekeeper or network functions of HMOs with partial coverage of out-of-
network services, accounted for the remaining portion of the market See id.
239. See U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 599 (noting that multitude of other providers in New
Hampshire precluded finding that Healthsource possessed monopoly); cf Marshfiekd 65 F.3d at
1412 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that defendant HMO "is not a monopolist of HMO services...
because HMOs are not a market").
240. SeeEnthoven, supra note 4, at 25 (articulating flaws in structure of health care financing
market). Professor Enthoven describes the imperfections of the traditional health care market,
and their perverse economic consequences, as follows:
(1) Free choice of doctor by the patient, which means that the insurer has no
bargaining power with the doctor, (2) free choice of prescription by the doctor, which
prevents the insurer from applying quality assurance or review of appropriateness; (3)
direct negotiation between doctor and patient regarding fees, which excludes the third-
party payor, who would be likely to have information, bargaining power, and an
incentive to negotiate to hold down fees; (4) fee-for-service payment, which allows
physicians maximum control over their incomes by increasing the services provided;
and (5) solo practice, because multi-specialty group practice constitutes a break in the
seamless web of mutual coercion through control of referrals that the medical
profession has used to enforce [its] guild system.
Id.
241. At least one court has already relied on Kodak to impute market power to an HMO.
See Brokerage Concepts, Inc., No. 95-1698, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6480, at *18-*19 (E.D. Pa. May
14, 1996) (holding, under Kodak, that relevant product market was all members of single
dominant HMO); see also Alain C. Enthoven, Why Managed Care Has Failed to Contain Health Costs,
HEALTH A., Fall 1993, at 28-29 (asserting that proliferation of HMOs and PPOs in 1980s failed
to contain health costs because of various "artificial market imperfections").
242. See infra notes 286-302 and accompanying text (describing how adverse selection, pre-
existing condition exclusions, and exclusive provider contracts could reduce elasticity of supply
and demand for HMOs, leading to divergence of HMOs from health care financing market).
There is empirical support for the conclusion that HMOs operate in an economically distinct
market from other forms of health care financing. See Reed Neil Osen, The Impact of Health
Maintenance Organizations on Health and Health Care Costs, 25 APPLIED ECON. 1451, 1451 (1993)
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would hold substantially higher market share because the diluting
effect of other forms of health care financing would be lost.2" The
divergence of markets, therefore, would increase HMO market power
under either traditional. 4 or modem antitrust principles."
A. Market Imperfections Increasing I11O Market Power
Under traditional economic analysis, use of the "market share
proxy" meant that courts were unlikely to find that small firms
possessed market power.' 6 This analysis, however, relied on basic
assumptions about the effects of a firm's size on elasticity of sup-
ply2'7 and demand.24  The modem analysis of Kodak and Jefferson
Parish takes a less formalistic approach, 49 recognizing that even
(noting that, although HMOs are cheaper than other forms of health care financing, studies
have found little evidence that they contain aggregate health costs). Thus, cost containment
effected by HMOs does not affect the rate of inflation of other forms of health care financing.
See Enthoven, supra note 241, at 29 (asserting that competition among HMOs has not reduced
growth in total national health expenditures). But cf. Christianson, supra note 14, at 155 (stating
it has been hypothesized that more conservative style of medical practice fostered by HMOs will
"spill over" to other forms of health care financing).
243. Although HMOs account for only 25% of the health care financing products in large
markets, most large markets are dominated by only one HMO. See INTERSTUDY REGIONAL
MARKETANALysis, supra note 169, at I (reporting HMO penetration of 25% in large markets and
that 74.4% of large markets have one dominant HMO). HMOs account for 17.6% of the health
care financing products in medium markets. See id. Most medium markets, however, have at
least two significant market shares. See id. at 33. HMOs account for 12% of the health care
financing products in small markets. See id. at 1. Forty-two percent of these markets, however,
are served by only one HMO. See id.
244. SeeJacobs, supra note 11, at 342 & n.25 (noting that market share traditionally has been
used as the proxy for market power).
245. See id. at 355-62 (explaining Court's movement in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), from the traditional "market share proxy" to new form of
market power assessment). This new assessment looks for explanations of the actual behavior
of markets. See id at 473.
246. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984) (explaining that
existence of market power ordinarily is inferred from seller's possession of predominant market
share). As elasticity of demand decreases, meaning fewer suitable substitute products are
available, smaller firms become capable of raising prices above competitive levels without
experiencing a loss in sales. See Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 958-59 & tbl. II.
247. Elasticity of supply was the second most important determinant of market power under
traditional analysis. See Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 958, tbL II (demonstrating that firm
operating in market with high entry barriers to competitors can raise prices without losing sales
only if there are few suitable substitutes available).
248. See id. (showing market share necessary for firm to have market power under variety of
competitive conditions). Traditional analysis viewed demand elasticity as the most important
factor in determining whether a firm could exercise market power. See id. Professors Landes
and Posner observe that a firm operating in a market with highly elastic demand but inelastic
supply must have larger market share in order to raise prices to a monopolistic level than a firm
in a market with highly elastic supply but inelastic demand. See id.; see also supra note 158
(describing emphasis placed on elasticity of demand by courts in Marshfield, U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
and Ball Mem'I Hosp.).
249. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466 (holding that legal presumptions based on "formalistic
distinctions" instead of"market realities" generally are disfavored in antitrust law). Rather than
considering only market share, the Court will consider the "responsiveness of the sales of one
1996] HMO ANTITRUST IABiuTriY
small firms can wield power in markets where imperfections artificially
suppress supply and demand.25° Such market imperfections, includ-
ing high costs for consumers to switch from one product to another,
information deficiencies, and financing arrangements that reduce
price competition, exist today in the health care financing mar-
ket.2
5'
1. Increased switching costs
Consumers in the health care financing market commonly
experience high switching costs when a medical condition, which is
covered under their current health plan, is excluded from coverage
under a subsequent plan because it is considered a "pre-existing
condition. '252  Pre-existing condition exclusions raise the cost and
risk of switching from one health plan to another because consumers
who change plans must pay the costs for future treatment related to
the pre-existing condition out of their own pockets.255 These
individuals frequently are charged higher premiums even though
coverage of the condition is excluded under the new plan. 254  High
switching costs in the health care financing market make the cost of
changing health plans prohibitive for many individuals; frequently
product to price changes of the other." Id. at 467 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956)); see also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29 (holding that
Court will examine economic reality of market at issue).
250. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477 (holding that it is reasonable to infer Kodak possessed market
power because there was evidence of high information costs, locked-in consumers and
discriminatory pricing);Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27-28 (suggesting that diminished consumer
incentive to compare hospital costs and lack of adequate information to compare quality among
hospitals, if coupled with restraints on consumer choice of provider, could give rise to antitrust
liability even in the absence of substantial market share).
251. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (describing three factors identified in
Kodak and Jefferson Parish that can give rise to market power in absence of significant market
share); see also infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text (describing how exclusions on pre-
existing conditions raise switching costs, causing consumer "lock-in" in health care financing
market).
252. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILIY, REFORM COULD
INSURE CONTINUED COVERAGE FOR UP TO 25 MILuON AMERICANS (Sept. 19, 1995) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT] (reporting that most private health plans impose waiting periods for new
enrollees and limit coverage for pre-existing conditions). Payors impose waiting periods and
limitations on coverage of pre-existing conditions to protect themselves against employees who
purchase coverage knowing they are already sick. See id.
253. See Health Insurance Reform Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 1028 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 4 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter
Health Insurance Reform Act Hearings] (noting that workers who switch insurance plans during a
change ofjobs risk losing coverage for pre-existing conditions, the very illnesses for which they
are most likely to require care).
254. See id. (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (suggesting that employers currently exclude
employees with pre-existing conditions from group health plans because such employees raise
group health plan costs).
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they are so high that consumers refuse to changejobs for fear of also
having to change health plans. 5
The plight of consumers who develop a pre-existing condition while
covered by a health care plan is similar to that of the consumers in
Kodak who made a large, but seemingly reasonable, initial expendi-
ture to purchase Kodak equipment.256 Consumers with pre-existing
conditions cannot "switch" to substitute health plans in response to a
price increase without incurring disproportionately high costs.
27
Pre-existing condition limitations thus are a market imperfection that
increases switching costs and artificially reduces elasticity of de-
mand.2' The Court in Kodak held that such an imperfection could
confer market power on firms that hold low market share. " 9
255. See id. (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that risk of losing health coverage prevents
many workers from changing jobs, a phenomenon called "job lock"). In 1993, 20% of
Americans said they or a family member declined a new job opportunity due to fear of losing
health benefits. See Health Insurance Portability: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm.
on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 10 (May 12, 1995) (statement of Paul Fronstin,
Employee Benefit Research Institute) [hereinafter Health Insurance Portability Hearings]. 'Job
lock" is analogous to the consumer "lock in" that led the Court in Kodak to conclude that the
defendant had market power despite its lack of significant market share. SeeEastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476 (1992) (finding that consumers who would
lose their large initial investment in Kodak equipment by switching brands faced high switching
costs). The effects ofjob lock could, if pervasive enough, lead courts to conclude that an HMO
has market power in the absence of significant market share.
A worker experiencing 'job lock" dares not change jobs for fear that a pre-existing condition
will make the cost of switching health coverage cost prohibitive, if alternative coverage is
available at all. See Health Insurance Portability Hearings, supra, at 12. The Court in Kodak held
that consumers who were "locked in" to a Kodak machine because of high switching costs would
tolerate larger price increases than other consumers before they changed brands. SeeKodak, 504
U.S. at 476. The same is true of workers who remain at theirjobs solely to enjoy the continued
availability of employer-sponsored health coverage. See Health Insurance Portability Hearings, supra,
at 10.
256. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 472 (noting that consumer "lock-in" could allow Kodak to charge
competitive prices in the equipment market, but supracompetitive prices in the parts and service
market). Similar to the case in Kodak, an insurer is able to offer low premiums initially to win
the business of customers. If an insured becomes ill, however, the insurer can raise the
premium without fear that the insured will seek coverage elsewhere, because coverage for the
illness will be excluded by other insurers.
257. See Health Insurance Refom Act Hearings, supra note 253, at 4 (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(stating that pre-existing conditions make many consumers completely uninsurable). Roughly
81 million Americans have conditions that could subject them to pre-existing condition
exclusions. See id. (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
258. See Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 945 (explaining that elasticity of demand
depends on ability of consumers to switch to substitute goods in response to price increase); see
also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956) ("[W]here there
are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their purposes... [market power] does
not exist .... ).
259. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473 (noting that high switching cost was strong reason for finding
market power in absence of high market share). Furthermore, the court observed that "the
heavy initial outlay for Kodak equipment" made switching to a competing product very costly
for Kodak customers. See id. at 477.
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2. Information deficiencies
The lack of comparative information about health plans and the
widely disparate coverage policies offered by such plans are two major
barriers to price competition in the health care financing market.
260
Most insurers offer arcane coverage provisions that are difficult for
consumers to understand.261 Quality measures are all but nonexis-
tent, impeding consumer ability to compare the value of plans per
dollar charged.262 Consumers frequently are unaware that their health
plan excludes coverage of pre-existing conditions or that they can be
dropped from the plan if they become ill.263 Just as in Kodak, this
absence of uniformity among products, and the inability to predict
the "lifecycle" cost of obtaining health coverage under various plans,
impedes consumers' ability to make direct price, coverage, and quality
comparisons.
3. Payment policies that reduce price competition
Employer payment policies and federal tax laws decrease consumer
price consciousness in the health care financing market. Employer
payment of full premiums for their employees' health coverage
reduces employee price consciousness in selecting a health plan.2
Under such arrangements, employers pay the full premium for health
coverage regardless of price.2" HMOs thus gain few customers by
cutting prices and lose few customers by raising prices,26 making
demand inelastic.267  Similar policies, such as those requiring
260. See Enthoven, supra note 241, at 38-39 (decrying product differentiation in health care
financing market and calling for employer policies requiring standardized coverage contracts);
Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Deivery Systems and Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L.
REv. 1507, 1510 (1994) (noting that "prevalence of information gaps, asymmetric information,
and agency problems interferes with competitive interactions in the health care marketplace.").
261. See Enthoven, supra note 241, at 38-39 (noting health insurer practice of offering
complex package makes it difficult for people to make cost comparison).
262. See Olsen, supra note 242, at 1451 (stating that lack of empirical information on HMO
quality is attributable to lack of objective means for measuring health).
263. See Health Insurance Reform Act Hearings, supranote 253, at 4 (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(noting that those who have paid premiums for years can be dropped because they become ill).
264. See Enthoven, supra note 241, at 34 (noting that employer policies of paying full cost
of HMO premiums puts HMOs in the same "state of cost-unconscious demand as fee-for-service
providers").
265. See id. (indicating that employers will pay HMO premiums that do not exceed those of
traditional coverage).
266. See id.; see also Christianson, supra note 14, at 154 (stating that when employees have
multiple coverage options, but are required to pay at least part of premium difference, they
make price-conscious decisions).
267. See Enthoven, supra note 241, at 34 (indicating that employer contribution to
employee's health plan creates inelastic demand for HMOs).
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employees to make the same premium contribution regardless of the
type of plan they choose, can have the same effect.
2 8
The current tax code also understates price competition among
health plans.269  Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code270
allows employers to pay the cost of health premiums in pre-tax
dollars.2 1  The pre-tax payment artificially increases the amount of
money available to purchase health insurance and reduces the
amount of any apparent differences in premiums.272 Thus, an HMO
that cuts its price by a certain amount gains only a fraction of the
customers it would normally gain with such a price cut.273 Converse-
ly, an HMO that raises its price loses only a fraction of the customers
it would normally lose. 4
4. Limitation on consumer choice of providers
A second market imperfection, which raises HMO liability under
the Jefferson Parish analysis, is the tendency of employers to limit the
number of HMOs offered in their benefit plans.275 Such limitations
reduce price competition among HMOs by allowing the contracting
HMO to raise prices to the level of competing fee-for-service plans
without losing customers. This scenario provides an apt example
of the "cellophane fallacy," wherein imperfect competition makes
poor substitutes appear interchangeable.277 It is worth noting,
however, that the practice of offering a limited number of HMOs to
employees does not completely eliminate price competition because
employers offering an HMO as a coverage option will often compare
rates among competing HMOs before initially signing up a single
contractor.
268. See Christianson, supra note 14, at 154 (examining effect of employer health premium
contribution policies on rate increases).
269. See Enthoven, supra note 241, at 36-37 (noting that employer ability to pay for health
insurance premiums in pre-tax dollars understates price differences among health plans).
270. 26 U.S.C. § 125 (1994) (making employer payments for health benefits excludable from
employee gross income).
271. See Enthoven, supra note 241, at 36.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 37.
274. Seeid.
275. See id. at 38 (noting that employer policies restricting choice of HMOs artificially reduce
HMO demand elasticity).
276. See id.
277. See Gellhorn & Kovacic, supra note 53, at 103 (suggesting that, in du Pont, Court failed
to consider whether high cross-elasticity among manufacturers of flexible wrapping materials
meant only that du Pont, exclusive manufacturer of cellophane, had already raised prices to
monopolistic levels). Cross-elasticity of demand is an accurat6 test of whether two products are
good substitutes only if competitive prices are being charged for each. See id.
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The Court in Jefferson Parish held that small firms could possess
power in markets made imperfect by payment policies that reduce
price consciousness and restrict consumer choice of provider.
278
Employee benefit policies, combined with federal tax laws, have
introduced such imperfections to the health care financing market.
HMOs operating in these markets, therefore, could be held liable for
antitrust offenses under the Jefferson Parish analysis.
B. Economic Factors Creating the Potential for a Discrete HMO Market
Market definition relies heavily on principles of elasticity of supply
and demand. 79 Certain trends accompanying the flood of enroll-
ment in HMOs in recent years,28° coupled with market imperfec-
tions, could substantially decrease elasticity of supply and demand,
causing the HMO and health care financing markets to diverge for
purposes of antitrust analysis.28' Specifically, the trend toward
adverse selection could create a bifurcated market in which HMOs are
the only affordable health care financing product for younger and
healthier individuals, while fee-for-service plans present the only viable
coverage option for older and sicker individuals. 8 2  Coverage
exclusions for pre-existing conditions already have brought about
substantial consumer "lock-in." '283 Finally, the use by HMOs of
exclusive provider contracts could prevent the entry of new competi-
278. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27-28 (1984).
279. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956). The
Court explained: "In considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of
price and competition, no more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably
interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes make up that 'part of trade or commerce,'
monopolization of which may be illegal." Id.
Measurement of product substitution and elasticity of supply are common to the assessment
of both market power and definition. Thus, the Court somewhat circuitously has acknowledged
an interrelationship between the ability of a firm to exert power over a market and the
definition of that market. See id. at 391-92 (using term "monopoly power" synonymously with
market power). Justice Reed, delivering the opinion of the Court, observed:
If cellophane is the 'market' that du Pont is found to dominate, it may be assumed it
does have monopoly power over that "market." Monopoly power is the power to
control prices or exclude competition.... It is inconceivable that price could be
controlled without power over competition or vice versa.
Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted).
280. See supra notes 3 & 22 (noting that HMO enrollment grew from less than two million
in early 1970s to more than 46 million in 1995, an increase of 2300%).
281. See infra notes 286-302 and accompanying text (describing how increasing HMO
enrollment, coupled with adverse selection and exclusions on coverage of pre-existing
conditions, could cause HMO market to diverge from health care financing market).
282. See Greaney, supra note 260, at 1511 (observing that adverse selection can segment
health care market between healthy, or "good risk," and unhealthy, or "bad risk," populations).
283. See supra notes 252-59 and accompanying text (comparing circumstances under which
pre-existing condition locks consumer into his or her current health plan with consumer "lock-
in" under Kodak analysis).
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tors into the market." If both supply and demand become inelas-
tic, courts could conclude that HMOs operate in a market separate





HMOs have exhibited a tendency to enroll healthier patients, while
sicker patients remain in fee-for-service plans. 26 This phenomenon,
known as "adverse selection,"28 7 could substantially reduce elasticity
of HMO supply if allowed to continue over an extended period.
Presently, new entrants to the HMO market enjoy relatively low
structural entry barriers.21 New HMOs are able to attract new
enrollees from fee-for-service plans easily.2 9 With continuing mass-
enrollment in managed care,2 ° however, adverse selection could
create a structural dichotomy in the health care financing market,
whereby a predominant number of healthy patients enroll in HMOs
and sicker patients remain in fee-for-service plans.29l  Adverse
selection could eliminate a large portion of the pool of potential new
HMO enrollees by making unavailable, or undesirable, those enrolled
in fee-for-service plans.
292
284. See Bloch & Falk, supra note 10, at 211 (observing that widespread use of exclusivity
clauses in given market could make high percentage of physicians unavailable to contract with
HMOs wishing to enter market, rendering supply inelastic).
285. See supra notes 177-214 and accompanying text (describing courts' emphasis in defining
markets on product interchangeability and ease with which producers of similar goods can
"switch" production in response to price increase by competitor).
286. See, e.g., Christianson, supra note 14, at 149-50 (citing several studies that "conclude that
staff and group model HMOs benefit from favorable selection relative to IPA models and
indemnity insurance plans"); Enthoven, supra note 241, at 39-40 (exploring consequences and
methods of avoiding "biased risk selection"); Olsen, supra note 242, at 1451 (stating that HMOs
tend to enroll healthier patients with substantially lower health care costs).
287. Enthoven, supra note 241, at 40.
288. See Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir.
1986) (finding that new firms may enter health care financing market easily). The Court found
that firms "need only a license and capital" to enter the market. Id. It found, further, that
competitors of defendant already had both and could expand their sales quickly. See id.
289. See 1994 INTERSTuDY REPORT, supra note 3, at 11, fig. 5 (1994) (showing that nearly
equal number of HMOs reported new group enrollment from former customers of indemnity
insurers versus members of another local HMO).
290. See supra notes 3 & 22 (describing managed care enrollment trends).
291. See Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of RI., 883
F.2d 1101, 1103 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting under adverse selection, "younger and healthier people
opt for HMOs... leaving older and sicker people" in the fee-for-service pool).
292. See 1994 INTERSTUDY REPORT, supra note 3, at 11, fig. 5 (showing that nearly equal
number of HMOs reported enrolling new groups from indemnity insurer versus another local
HMO).
1996] HMO ANTITRUST LIABiuTY
2. HMO use of exclusive provider contracts
Physicians who treat the more complex illnesses encountered by
fee-for-seirvice patients may be reluctant to enter HMO panels because
of HMO pressure to practice a more conservative style of medicine,
with higher patient volume and lower per-capita reimbursement.
293
The use of exclusive provider contracts could further decrease
elasticity of HMO supply by making unavailable physicians who
otherwise would be willing to contract with newly forming HMOs.
2 4
If such physicians are unavailable, competitors will be unable to form
new HMOs in response to supracompetitive pricing by existing HMOs.
Exclusivity clauses restricting mobility among physicians who treat
HMO patients, therefore, could take on heightened significance in
the new antitrust analysis. 295  Similarly, a preponderance of physi-
cian-panelists who hold an ownership interest in their respective
HMOs9. could restrict market entry because the economic self-
interest of doctor-owners will cause them to refuse to serve other
HMOs.9 7
293. See Christianson, supra note 14, at 149 (noting that HMOs recruit physicians who
practice conservative style of medicine, involving lower utilization of services); Ocean State
Physicians, 883 F.2d at 1104 (noting that one-quarter ofphysicians on HMO panel resigned after
competing insurer instituted policy of paying no more than physicians charged HMO); cf. Olsen,
supra note 242, at 1451 (concluding that HMOs initially cause an increase in utilization, but over
time physicians practicing in HMOs learn to practice cost-effective medicine).
294. See Bloch & Falk, supra note 10, at 217 (observing that widespread use of exclusivity
clauses in given market could make high percentage of physicians unavailable to contract with
HMOs wishing to enter market, thereby rendering supply inelastic).
295. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993) (calling
25% of physicians in geographic market tied to Healthsource by exclusivity clause "significant").
The court noted that, although it might be proper to exclude many "available" physicians in the
market because they were unwilling to serve HMOs, no such showing was made by the plaintiff.
See id; see also Anita J. Slomski, Is this Group an Illegal Doctor Monopoly? Marshfield Clinic in
Marshfield, Wisconsin, MEDIcAL ECON., Sept. 26, 1994, at 64 (describing plaintiff's allegation that
restrictive covenant preventing doctors who leave defendant clinic from practicing within 25-mile
radius for three years was evidence of anticompetitive conduct).
296. See Mazy ChrisJaklevic, Docs Ty to Own Managed Care: Fed Up With Big For-Profit HMOs,
Physicians Across the Nation Are Forming Their Own Plans, MODERN HEALTHcARE, Apr. 24, 1995, at
63 (noting that physicians who have tired of working for HMOs are increasingly forming their
own competing HMOs).
297. See U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 594 (acknowledging that agreement among doctor-
stockholders of HMO not to deal with any other HMO could warrant per se condemnation if
bereft of joint venture efficiencies); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 359
(1982) (holding doctor-initiated PPO liable for per se offense of price fixing under Sherman
Act § 1, where physician members of PPO, comprising 75% of all those practicing in county, set
maximum reimbursement rates).
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3. Exclusion of coverage for pre-existing conditions
Although exclusions of coverage for pre-existing conditions are
prevalent among most forms of health care financing,298 HMOs
generally do not exclude coverage of such conditions.299 Conse-
quently, individuals covered by HMOs who develop "pre-existing
conditions" can seek coverage from competing HMOs, but their
ability to switch from HMOs to alternative forms of health care
financing is severely limited."s t While individuals covered by fee-for-
service or PPO plans are able to switch to HMOs, the more restrictive
benefit policies of HMOs may make them poor substitutes for these
other forms of health care financing."0' Such non-interchangeability
among HMOs and other forms of insurance (or low cross-elasticity of
demand) could induce courts to conclude that HMOs constitute a
product market separate from health care financing."0 2
C. Consequences
Relevant factors in determining the existence of market power
today include: (1) elasticity of supply, °3 reflected by the ability of
298. See GAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 4 (reporting that 59% of indemnity plans, 70% of
PPOs, and 56% of point-of-service plans impose exclusions on pre-existing conditions, while
HMOs typically do not have such clauses).
299. See id. One possible explanation for HMOs' coverage of pre-existing conditions is the
fact that HMOs are self-selective and tend to enroll healthier patients. See supra notes 285-91
and accompanying text (noting that restrictive benefits of HMOs leads to "adverse selection"
whereby HMOs enroll healthier individuals).
300. See GAO REPORT, supra note 252, at 4 (reporting that most indemnity and PPO plans
impose exclusions on coverage of pre-existing conditions); HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM ACT
HEARINGS, supra note 253, at 4 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that some of 81 million
consumers with conditions that could be considered "pre-existing" are completely unable to
obtain traditional health insurance).
301. See Christianson, supra note 14, at 160 (noting that workers may find HMOs to be
unattractive option). Many individuals covered by non-HMO plans choose these plans because
they offer more generous benefits without restricting choice of provider, and thus are better
suited to their more frequent or serious medical needs. See id. (noting that hospital admission
rates are between 10% and 40% higher in fee-for-service plans than in HMOs). These
individuals frequently are older or more prone to illness and perceive HMOs as offering
inadequate coverage to suit their needs. See i& at 149-50 (noting that HMOs enroll individuals
with a low propensity to use their services).
302. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956) (calling
for assessment of "cross-elasticity of demand" in determining relevant product market); Landes
& Posner, supra note 35, at 945 (concluding that high elasticity of demand implies that good
substitutes exist for products sold within market, and presence of good substitutes limits any
individual firm's market power).
303. See Ball Mem'l Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986)
(finding defendant lacked market power where new firms could enter market easily, existing
firms could expand sales quickly, and there were no barriers to entry). But see Reazin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc. 899 F.2d 951, 971-72 (10th Cir.) (noting that several factors,
including insurer's great size in comparison to other insurers, its unique ability to contract
directly with hospitals, and widespread perception that it operated with imprimatur of state
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firms to shift production to offer a product similar to that of a
competitor in response to a price increase;"' (2) elasticity of
demand,"0 5 reflected by consumer tendency to purchase "substitute"
products in response to a price increase;0 6 and (3) the existence of
market imperfections."0 ' Market share, while still relevant, is no
longer the "proxy" for market power under the modem analysis;
08
rather, it is merely a probative indicator of elasticity of demand and
supply.30
9
legislature, tended to indicate that substantial entry barriers existed to competitors).
304. See Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 945 (stating that high elasticity of supply means
that even small price increase by one firmn will be met with increased output by its competitors).
A firm in a market with high elasticity of supply will experience highly elastic de-
mand--customers will quickly change to substitute brands produced by its competitors in
response to a price increase. See id.
Further, Professors Landes and Posner observe that when supply is highly elastic, that is,
competing sellers can expand their sales in response to a price increase by another firm, market
share takes on additional significance. See id. at 947. If competing firms are very small in
comparison to a dominant firm that raises its prices, their ability to increase output also will be
small. See id. A large firm, therefore, will lose only a small amount of sales in response to a
price increase. See id. Thus, if a dominant firm has high market share and the "competitive
fringe" has low market share, elasticity of demand will be low. See id.; see also Reazin, 899 F.2d
at 971-72 (noting that insurer's great size in comparison to competing insurers tended to
indicate that substantial entry barriers existed to competitors and that it possessed market
power).
305. See du Pont, 351 U.S. at 394 (calling for assessment of "cross-elasticity of demand" in
determining relevant product market). The Court explained, "where there are market
alternatives that buyers may readily use for their purposes, illegal monopoly does not exist." lId;
see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir.
1995) (ruling that HMOs are part of health care financing market because individuals and
employers, as purchasers of health care financing, regard HMOs as interchangeable with other
forms of health care financing), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 591 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding lower court ruling that HMOs
exist in broadly defined health care financing market because they are viewed as interchange-
able with fee-for-service arrangements, Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans, Medicare, and Medicaid);
Ball Mem'l Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1382 (noting that consumers will readily switch from one form of
health care financing to another in response to a price increase).
306. See Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 945 (concluding that high elasticity of demand
implies that good substitutes exist for products sold within market, and presence of good
substitutes limits any individual firm's market power).
307. SeeJacobs, supra note 11, at 355-62 (stating that, in Kodak, Supreme Court rejected
market share proxy in favor of analysis recognizing small firms' ability to obtain power in
imperfect market).
308. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992)
(holding that legal presumptions based on "formalistic distinctions" instead of "market realities"
generally are disfavored in antitrust law). Rather than considering only market share, therefore,
the Court will consider the "responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the
other." Id. at 467 (quoting E.I du Pont, 351 U.S. at 400); see alsojefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (holding that Court will examine economic reality of market
at issue).
309. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27 (holding that mere information deficiencies causing
consumer indifference to price and quality are insufficient to confer market power where market
share of 30% evidenced absence of actual restraints on consumer choice); Image Technical
Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 617 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that,
despite market imperfections, Kodak's small market share in equipment market might prevent
it from possessing power in "aftermarket" for parts and service), afftd 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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The health care financing market exhibits each of the imperfec-
tions that portend liability under Kodak and Jefferson Parish. It has
information deficiencies, financing arrangements that reduce price
competition, and high costs for consumers to switch from one
product to another.310 Courts employing the new antitrust analysis,
therefore, could hold HMOs liable for antitrust offenses either as
small firms operating in the imperfect market for health care
financing or as large firms operating in a discrete HMO market.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Legal Principles to More Accurately Assess Market Power and Define
Markets
1. Combine the Kodak andJefferson Parish tests
Courts should combine the Kodak test, focusing on market
imperfections that reduce elasticity of demand, with that of Jefferson
Parish, focusing on elasticity of supply. Antitrust liability can attach
under such a combined test only where a small firm: (1) exploits
market imperfections; (2) exhibits the ability to raise prices above the
competitive level without losing customers to an existing competitor;
and (3) impedes the entry of new competitors into the market.
Adoption of such a rule serves three purposes.
First, it creates a competitive market for comparative product
information. By acknowledging the competitive significance of
information deficiencies, the rule gives insurers the incentive to
provide accurate information about the prices and terms of their own
products. Further, it allows insurers to police their competitors by
encouraging consumers to compare information about their own
product with information provided by a competing firm. As a result,
it could even create a new "submarket" for comparative information
about insurance products.
Second, the rule appropriately contains antitrust liability. It
acknowledges that failure to provide product information can be
considered an anticompetitive act only if the information deficiency
reduces price competition and hinders the entry of new competitors
into the market. Moreover, the rule recognizes that sellers are best
suited to provide consumers with information about the prices and
terms of their own products. The rule would not impose liability on
310. See supra notes 151-66 and accompanying text (describing market imperfections giving
rise to antitrust liability in absence of market share under Kodak and Jefferson Paish).
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small firms that lawfully attain power in an imperfect market because
they failed to provide comparative information about their competi-
tors. Instead, small firms would be liable only if they exploited
information deficiencies in order to charge supracompetitive prices
and exclude competitors.
Third, the rule is administrable without a re-engineering of
traditional antitrust principles. It holds small firms liable for antitrust
offenses only when they: (1) obtain market power by virtue of a
market imperfection; (2) exercise market power through an
anticompetitive act; and (3) cause antitrust injury through unfair
prices or terms, or by foreclosing entry of new competitors. The
preservation of traditional antitrust principles will afford firms greater
certainty in assessing their antitrust exposure.
2. Adhere to a fact-based, rather than assumption-based, analysis for
finding market power and defining markets
Courts and enforcers should employ a fact-based, rather than
assumption-based, analysis to define product markets and measure
market power in the health care field.3 ' Such an analysis will cut
short the unhealthy legacy of Marshfield and maintain prevailing
Supreme Court precedent, which emphasizes factual inquiry into
"market realities" above assumptions or "formalistic distinctions" about
markets. 12 The court in Marshfield departed from the norm of
relying on juries to find legal meaning in the complex web of factual
evidence presented in antitrust cases. 3  It resorted instead to
declarations based more on intuitive analysis than factual determina-
tions in overturning ajury verdict and placing HMOs squarely in the
health care financing market. 14
311. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text (critiquing Seventh Circuit's analysis in
Marshfiel, in which court relieved HMO of antitrust liability based on its assumption that it is
"well known" that consumers view HMOs and other forms of health coverage as interchange-
able); cf. Burda, supra note 92, at 40-41 (quoting Robert Bloch, former head of Department of
Justice health care antitrust unit, as commenting that DOJ "was willing to make an awful lot of
assumptions regarding material issues" in approving plan in which 100% of South Carolina's
board certified dermatologists formed network).
312. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 467 (noting Court's preference for resolution of antitrust claims
on "case-by-case basis").
313. Marshfield Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 93, at 9; see also Kodak, 504 U.S. at 463
(holding that market definition "should be resolved by the trier of fhct").
314. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410
(7th Cir. 1995) ("The record shows, what is anyway well known, that individuals, and medical
insurers... regard HMOs as competitive not only with each other, but also with [fee-for-service
plans and PPOs]."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996). The court claimed to have searched the
record in vain for evidence that would support the jury's finding. See id. A search of the court's
opinion to determine exactly what was missing, however, yields scant evidence of an inspection
of the lower court record, and more general discussion of"contemporary principles of antitrust."
1996]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:91
The paradox of the court's approach in Marshfield is that much of
the economic analysis employed in antitrust law relies on consumers'
perceptions about product interchangeability and availability. The
court in Marshfield, however, discounted the jury's ability to accurately
interpret factual evidence on product interchangeability and
availability to find the existence of a discrete HMO market and then
assess market power.1 5 In essence, the court held that the percep-
tions and behavior of consumers in the marketplace can be dispositive
of a firm's market power and the boundaries of its relevant product
market. However, the judgment of these same consumers sitting as
jurors is not competent to discern antitrust liability.
The consequences of assuming without significant factual inquiry
that the HMO market cannot be separated from that of other forms
of health care financing are threefold: (1) it permits large-scale
consolidation of HMOs;316 (2) it impedes efforts to foster competi-
tion by protecting the creation of new HMOs;317 and (3) it sup-
plants a particularized analysis by the factfinder of competition in
specific markets with what the court considers to be "well known"
about markets generally.
318
By preserving a fact-based antitrust analysis, courts can ensure that
the "salubrious effects" of competition are felt in the rapidly develop-
ing health care market. Such an analysis, by refusing to define the
market unnecessarily broadly, will foster competition among HMOs,
not just between HMOs and other forms of health care financing. A
fact-based, rather than assumption-based, analysis recognizes that
anticompetitive behavior by one HMO directed against another HMO
does not lose its legal significance solely because HMOs frequently
function alongside other insurance products in the health care
financing marketplace. Intra-HMO competition, in turn, will advance
the economic goals of managed care by promoting a rational system
of health care in which consumers, providers, and payors negotiate
over price, benefits, and quality.
Id.; see also Marshfield Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 93, at 9 & n.7 (noting that author of
appeals court's Marshfield decision is on record questioning ability ofjuries to sort out factual
issues in antitrust cases (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
235 (1976))).
315. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text (describing court's reasoning in
overruling jury verdict and substituting its own intuitive view of HMO market definition).
316. See Marshfield Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 93, at 3-4.
317. See id. at 4-5.
318. Seesupra notes 183-93 and accompanying text (describing how Seventh Circuit discarded
detailed factual inquiry in Marshfield and relied instead on general assumptions about
consumers' perception of interchangeability among HMOs and other types of health coverage).
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B. Economic Solutions to Prevent HMO Acquisition of Market Power
1. Lower switching costs by eliminating coverage exclusions and limiting
premium increases based on pre-existing conditions
The Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, enacted
during the 104th Congress, prohibits insurers from excluding
coverage for pre-existing conditions.3 9 When it takes effect July 1,
1997,320 the Act will help eliminate the high switching costs that
currently prevent many individuals from obtaining new health
coverage after an illness or change ofjobs. It will preserve competi-
tion among HMOs by allowing consumers to obtain new coverage in
response to an unfavorable pricing or coverage policy. In addition,
it will preserve the existence of a broader "health care financing"
market in which HMOs, which do not exclude coverage of pre-
existing conditions, compete with other forms of health care
financing.
The Act, however, will solve only half the problem of increased
switching costs associated with pre-existing conditions. Although it
forbids outright refusal to cover individuals with pre-existing condi-
tions, the Act fails to address the problem that arises when health
plans charge these individuals a premium so exorbitant that they
effectively are excluded from coverage. For these individuals, the cost
of changing health plans will remain prohibitive. Congress, therefore,
should monitor the behavior of health plans following implementa-
tion of the Act and take additional action if necessary.
2. Increase supply elasticity by decreasing adverse selection
Government should adopt reasonable fair marketing standards for
those in higher risk categories, such as the poor and the elderly. This
will attenuate the effects of adverse selection by preventing HMOs
from avoiding enrollment of individuals they consider likely to be
above-average utilizers of health care resources. Government,
however, should not force affirmative action on HMOs to enroll these
higher-risk groups. Adverse selection is, to some degree, the result of
rational decisions by consumers that their medical needs will be better
served in a fee-for-service plan than an HMO. Affirmative action for
high-risk groups might provide irrational incentives for sicker
319. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(1996) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
320. See id. § 701(g) (1) (forbidding exclusion of coverage for pre-existing conditions after
June 30, 1997).
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individuals to enroll in HMOs, which would be less suited to provide
for their medical needs. Fair marketing standards will ensure that the
decision rests with consumers about which type of plan best suits their
health care financing needs.
3. Increase demand elasticity by fostering price competition
a. Increase availability of information
The existence of widely disparate coverage policies among health
care financing products is a major barrier to price competition. This
disparity suppresses price competition by impeding consumers' ability
to make direct price, coverage, and quality comparisons. Large
employers can correct this imperfection by offering employees several
health coverage choices and requiring insurance companies to offer
uniform benefit packages.3 2' Such uniformity will enable employees
to make "apples to apples" comparisons on the price of alternative
health coverage plans. State governments can empower consumers
on a broader scale through the passage of laws requiring health plans
to provide uniform information to consumers or employers.3 2 State
governments already have succeeded in empowering small employers
to provide their employees with multiple coverage options by enacting
legislation to authorize the formation of purchasing cooperatives.323
b. Require employee cost sharing
Employee cost sharing is the most effective means of restoring price
competition to the health care financing market and preserving
elasticity of demand. Employees are more likely to make rational,
market-based decisions if they share in the cost of the health coverage
they choose. There are two ways employers can implement cost
sharing. First, and most effectively, employers can pay a fixed
321. See id. at 39 (citing cost containment success of CalPERS in adopting standardized
benefit package).
322. See Consumer-Oriented Disclosure Law for Health Plans Goes Into Effect, 4 Health Care Pol'y
Rep. (BNA) at 18 (Jan. 1, 1996) (reporting on enactment of Arizona law requiring HMOs to
provide employers with uniform information about HMO benefits). Arizona now requires
HMOs to provide employers with information including: (1) the full cost of the plan, including
premiums, co-pay, and deductible amounts; (2) the health care benefits to which enrollees are
entitled; and (3) any limitations on coverage. See id. At least seven other states, including
California, Oregon, and Texas, are considering the introduction of similar legislation. See id.
323. See Statewide Health Care Pool to Reduce Rates by 6 Percent, 21 Pens. & Benefits Rptr. (BNA)
671 (Mar. 28, 1994). California was the first state to enact legislation authorizing and funding
the formation of a health alliance serving small employers. The plan, called the "California
Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperative" ("HIPC"), effected a 6.27% premium cut for small
employers in its first year of operation. See id. HIPC further reduced premiums by 5% in 1995,
its second year of operation. See California Insurance Plan Negotiates 5 Percent Cut for Average
Premium Rate, Pens. & Benefits Rptr. (BNA), at 785 (Mar. 27, 1995).
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premium amount for the employee.324 The employee then would
be responsible for paying the difference between this amount and the
price of the health plan he or she chooses.3" Such a policy would
foster a high degree of price consciousness because employees are
responsible for the full difference in plan cost.3 26 The second way
employers can implement cost sharing is through payment of a fixed
percentage of employees' health care premiums. 27 Under such a
policy, employees would be responsible for only a percentage of the
difference in the premium cost of the health plan they choose.
3 28
While this approach has the advantage of fairness to employees who
would benefit from a fee-for-service plan, it fosters a lower level of
price consciousness among employees than payment of a fixed
premium amount.
c. Amend tax laws
Federal tax policy should foster health plan price competition by
encouraging employers to pay a fixed premium amount for employees
while making the employee responsible for the remaining
amount.3 29  The tax code should allow employers to pay a fixed
amount of health insurance premiums with pre-tax dollars. 3 This
amount could be set at the regional average cost of a health plan
minus ten percent. Such a policy would set a "target" pricing level at
the average health plan cost. Consumers would pay 100 percent of
the cost difference for plans priced above the average health plan
cost, and would save 100 percent of the cost difference for plans
priced below average. Such a policy would reduce fluctuations in the
price of health plans and encourage plans to compete on price until
they reach the point of lowest marginal return.3 Allowing employ-
ers to pay up to 90 percent of the actual cost of employee health
324. See Enthoven, supra note 241, at 34-37 (describing five cost-sharing policies and their





329. See 1995 INTERSTUDY REGIONAL MARKET ANALYSIS, supra note 169, at 66 (noting that
employers can transfer desires for low-cost, high-quality health care to employees by fostering
price sensitivity).
330. See id. (stating that employers who offer several health plans, but contribute only fixed
amount, such as premium amount of lowest cost plan, create most highly elastic demand for
health care).
331. See 1994 INTERSTUDY REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (reporting that, as HMO markets
become more competitive, relative price and variation in relative price becomes smaller).
1996]
THE AMERICAN UNmvRsnY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:91
insurance premiums provides a second, slightly less effective solu-
tion.
3 32
C. Actions HMOs Can Take to Avoid Antitrust Liability
HMOs can reduce their antitrust exposure by undertaking some of
the measures described above voluntarily, as well as by implementing
additional measures to preserve elasticity of supply and demand in the
health care financing market. Specifically, HMOs can:
o Limit the use of exclusive contracts and limit the notice
required of health care providers to terminate such contracts.
This will help ensure that HMO supply remains elastic by
preserving an adequate pool of providers willing to contract
with newly forming HMOs.
* Provide information about price, benefits, and coverage
limitations to employers and employees who subscribe to HMO
plans. This will help reduce the substantial cost of obtaining
comparative information about health plans. It will increase
price sensitivity among consumers and prevent costly "lock ins"
due to coverage' exclusions that are not easily understood by
consumers at the time of enrollment.
* Implement fair marketing procedures to ensure that enrollees
represent diverse risk groups rather than only low-risk groups.
This will help prevent an artificial division of HMO and fee-for-
service product markets, whereby HMOs would offer inade-
quate coverage for sicker individuals while fee-for-service plans
would be prohibitively expensive for healthier individuals.
CONCLUSION
To date, courts have defined the HMO market broadly to include
all health care financing products. In most of these markets, one or
two firms hold the dominant share of HMO enrollees, although these
enrollees account for only a small portion of the total insured
population. Dominant HMOs have been protected from liability
under traditional antitrust analysis by the "market share proxy," the
notion that a firm cannot wield market power unless it also holds a
substantial market share.
332. See Enthoven, supra note 241, at 34-37 (stating that employer payment of percentage of
health plan cost is less effective than payment of fixed premium amount, but more effective
than payment of full premium amount, in fostering price sensitivity); see also 1995 INTERSTuDY
REGIONAL MARK=r ANALYSiS, supra note 169, at 66 (reporting that employers who pay premiums
regardless of cost create the most inelastic demand).
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The Supreme Court, however, announced a new antitrust analysis
in Kodak and Jefferson Parish that attributes market power to small
firms operating in markets where certain "imperfections" suppress
competition. The health care financing market exhibits such
imperfections, including information deficiencies, high consumer
switching costs, and financing arrangements that reduce price
competition. HMOs, therefore, may be held liable for antitrust
offenses under the new analysis despite possessing low market share.
Market imperfections, coupled with increasing HMO enrollment,
threaten to suppress elasticity of supply and demand for HMOs, while
reducing consumers' ability to choose health plans and providers.
Courts, observing such economic inflexibility, may recognize a division
of the HMO and health care financing markets. In a market
comprised only of other HMOs, each individual HMO will hold a
substantially higher market share. A division of markets, therefore,
will confer market power on many HMOs even under the traditional
"market share proxy."
Increased antitrust liability for HMOs can have both positive and
negative consequences. Appropriately applied, it can ensure that the
principles of competition and efficiency on which HMOs are founded
remain intact. Unwarranted antitrust liability, however, can diminish
the benefits HMOs have brought to health care financing, including
lower prices and improved access to primary care. Courts, govern-
ment, and HMOs, therefore, should take specific steps to preserve
elasticity of supply and demand for HMOs, protect consumer choice,
and ensure that antitrust liability is apportioned appropriately.
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